



**PEACEMAKERS Project: “Peace Dialogue Campus
Network: Fostering Positive Attitudes between Migrants
and Youth in Hosting Societies”**

Strategy Paper

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STRATEGY PAPER

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I. Current migration policies in EU and non-EU countries

Norms and policies on immigration in Germany

Today, every fourth person in the Federal Republic of Germany has a so-called migration background. This means that either the person him*herself or one of his parents migrated to Germany. In total, this sums up to about 20 million people making Germany a migration country per se. Half of these people hold the German citizenship. The main reason behind migration towards Germany is family reunion followed by employment opportunities and asylum.

However, migration towards Germany underwent several phases and hence was followed by different phases of policies.

After World War II, migration to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) as well as to the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was mostly characterized by foreign labour recruitment, which was agreed upon by bilateral agreements with nations such as Italy, Greece and Turkey in the case of the FRG and Vietnam and Mozambique in case of the GDR. Both countries suffered under labour shortage due to different reasons. Before the building of the Berlin Wall in 1963, a lot of East-Germans fled the country to the West (616.051 people to be exact) and thus the nation lost a lot of its human capital. Hence, the Democratic Republic had to look for labour elsewhere, in particular in countries which were a member of the Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance). But consequently, after the erection of the Berlin Wall the FRG could not rely on German labour from the East anymore either and thus was forced to find other ways of labour migration to manage and handle the booming economy. Just before the first oil-crisis and following recruitment freeze in 1973, the so-called 'guest workers' came to a peak of 2.6 million persons in total in this year alone. Overall about 14 million labour migrants entered West-Germany until the late 1970ies, however 11 million of them returned to their countries of origins during the same time as planned originally by mentioned bilateral agreements. Still, millions of people did not return and reunited with their families in West-Germany. Nevertheless, the Republic in the West officially and publicly denied being an immigration

country although the obvious facts proved otherwise.

In the summer of 1990, just before reunification, the West-German Parliament passed the new version of the ‘Ausländergesetz’ (Aliens Act) and by this substituted the old one from 1965, which regulated most of the recruitment agreements of the previous decades. This new law was valid until the beginning of 2005 when it was substituted itself by the ‘Zuwanderungsgesetz’ (Immigration Act). The new act included a new residency law which was introduced mainly to control and limit the influx of foreigners into the country and to account again for the demand for foreign labour and specialists. From this point on, foreign academics and graduates could receive a temporary residence permit to look for jobs. After 2005 the ‘Zuwanderungsgesetz’ was then followed by several minor laws and regulations, such as the ‘Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechte von international Schutzberechtigten und ausländischen Arbeitskräften’ (Law on the Improvement of the Rights of Internationally Protected Persons and Foreign Workers) in 2013 and the ‘Arbeitsmigrationssteuerungsgesetz’ (Labour Migration Control Law) for highly skilled migrants in 2015 and ended for now in 2016 in the ‘Integrationsgesetz’ (Integration Act). In March 2020 the new ‘Einwanderungsgesetz’ (Immigration Act) will come into force and will then fully take account of Germany being an immigration country. Novelties in this law include that Non-EU citizens can enter Germany when showing a degree and a job commitment prior to their immigration. Additionally, recognized specialist (including non-academics) from Non-EU countries can initially immigrate to Germany for six months in order to look for a job if they have the means to provide for themselves during this period. In both new scenarios, priority checks if domestic specialists could fill the respective position are dropped. Tolerated asylum seekers will then have the chance to receive a positive stay perspective in case they can fully provide for themselves too. These measures are implemented to avoid the so-called ‘immigration into social security systems’. Using this rhetoric, it can be concluded that the legislators were influenced to follow right-wing populist narratives which became louder and more prominent after the ‘Summer of Migration’ in 2015.

On the other side though, deportations are planned to be made easier and more efficient e.g.

by giving the police the liberty to search for rejected asylum seekers and illegal migrants in private properties. Furthermore, asylum detention will be enlarged to normal state prisons but into separate areas than the domestic felons.

The year 2015 was the one with the highest numbers in people fleeing to the FRG from outside the EU. 2015 even exceeded the year 1992 in numbers, which was, until then, considered the year with the highest numbers of people fleeing from war and conflict. In total 890.000 refugees came to Germany during the so-called 'Summer of Migration'. This put a heavy burden on authorities and asylum requests could not be handled adequately at first. Furthermore, this number is by far considered the highest within the EU.

People did migrate to Germany in these high numbers during the summer, because the Dublin procedure was suspended temporarily by the German government in September 2015, meaning that refugees from Syria who already reached Hungary as a secure third country were allowed to enter Germany and seek asylum. But next to the Balkan route through Hungary, more than 1 million irregular migrants also made their way to Europe by boat through the Mediterranean route, most of them from countries such as Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Eritrea. This amount of people put a lot of pressure on Europe's politics and the pressures rose when in August 2015 a truck with 71 dead refugees was found in Austria and shortly after, the picture of the drowned toddler Alan Kurdi from Syria went viral while several thousand refugees gathered in Hungary during that time to travel further to Western Europe. The suspension of the Dublin procedure by the German government was thus the result and was taken in agreement with the Austrian and Hungarian counterparts. However, the reasons for refugees coming to Germany in particular are various. It is not just the suspension of the Dublin regulation but also the already large networks of people from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan living in the country next to the overall large numbers of people fleeing worldwide and its historically unique dimension.

Despite the famous quote of Chancellor Merkel 'Wir schaffen das' ('We can do this'), Germany's bureaucracy was not properly prepared and overwhelmed with the amount of people and

this unknown situation. That's why new structures were imposed quickly by the Federal Ministry of Interior, Building and Community (BMI) and its subordinated Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), staff capacity was increased, and bureaucratic process were adapted. Additionally, the German government discussed to declare several countries, especially in Northern Africa as well as Afghanistan, to secure countries of origin, so asylum seekers can be deported easier and quicker. This is seen as an attempt to reduce numbers of asylum seekers in Germany in total. Another attempt is to centralize asylum processes by so-called 'Ankerzentren' (anchor centres). By this, refugees are put into camps until their asylum application has either been granted or denied. The 'Ankerzentren' have only been introduced in some German provinces but have been heavily criticized by human rights NGOs and activists, due to their isolating factor and lack of opportunity for any interaction between newcomers and the local population and hence minimal chances for integration and settlement.

Besides these measures, institutional offers for integration have widened and possibilities for a permanent residency for tolerated migrants were improved. After arriving in Germany, refugees are divided into two groups. One with a promising stay perspective and the other with a less positive outlook. The latter group thus has little to none opportunities to participate in integration and language courses while waiting for their asylum decision.

When assessing the situation now in 2019, it be said that the 'Summer of Migration' put the state authorities as well as educational institutions and the labour market under a heavy strain test that has been passed merely adequately. Particularly in regard to child and school care, more 95% of refugee children coming to Germany since 2013 went to school three years later. On top of that, about a third of newcomer adults, who migrated to Germany since 2015 were employed by late 2018. Although there are still challenges to overcome, this development goes into the right direction.

But even before the 'Summer of Migration' in 2015, the BAMF had difficulties coping with the amount of asylum applications. Since 2008, the BAMF worked on less applications annually than new applications coming in. This caused a congestion and was not due to high numbers of

applications but based merely on shortage of staff. Consequently, refugees had to wait longer and deal with longer status of uncertainty about their stay perspective. Further, any first steps of integration have to be put off during the waiting period. These problems were addressed in 2013 already but it took a while until the new staff and employees were trained and had the right skills to work efficiently.

However, next to people migrating to Germany and staying in the country, there is also a number of people whose asylum application is not granted and are thus obliged to leave the country or whose stay perspective has rather little prospect. Yet, deportations are quite costly and for this reason the ‘Geordnete-Rückkehr-Gesetz’ (Ordered Return Act) came into force in August 2019. Now deportations are the last resort when asylum is denied. Before this final decision, financial incentives and counselling is offered to migrants if they return to their home countries voluntarily. On top of that, voluntary returnees will be paid for their travel costs but have to permanently confirm to not enter Germany again and additionally have to withdraw any pending judicial cases. Moreover, the German government has introduced certain support measures in countries such as Afghanistan, Albania, Ghana, Morocco and others in order to foster reintegration in the countries of origin. Yet, these measures do not seem to be able to cover the most severe reasons behind migration such as poor political security, destruction and ethnic and religious tensions.

When it comes to migrant family reunion, policy alterations were made as well. Over the years, family reunions had been the most important route to migrate to Germany, however since 2018 it is limited to 1,000 people monthly for migrants with subsidiary status and within a two-step framework it is determined who is actually allowed to follow his*her family towards the Federal Republic. Furthermore, it is important to have already acquired basic German language skills before migrating and reuniting.

However, there is not just asylum migration towards Germany of course. Also skilled migration policies were due to recent debates and policy changes. At first there was the ‘Westbalkan-Regelung’ (regulatory for migrants from the Western Balkans), which solely targeted people from this

area but did not account for any specific skills. In other words, people from the West Balkans could migrate to Germany to search employment because they originated from this area, not based on their qualifications and corresponding demands on the German labour market.

Within this context the discussions then focused on the ‘Fachkräfteeinwanderungsgesetz’ (short FEG; Law on Skilled Migration). The law has the objective to facilitate skilled migration by offering low threshold opportunities to enhance already obtained qualifications in the country of origin which otherwise would not be fully acknowledged by German authorities. By these means, it will be made easier for skilled migrants to start a live in Germany and will diminish the preferential treatment of academic versus occupational trained qualifications. To get one’s qualifications institutionally acknowledged in Germany has been rather complicated and hence the country does not attract high numbers of highly qualified migrants. The FEG addresses these legal deficiencies. Yet, it is still criticized because of its strict recognition procedures of foreign qualifications and university degrees and will not be sufficient on its own. In fact, it needs to be accompanied by an enlargement of the respective bureaucratic infrastructure. This is especially important as Germany faces a skill shortage due to its demographic development. For this reason, the mentioned ‘Einwanderungsgesetz’ (Immigration Law) coming in early 2020 will supplement these regulations and hopefully improve procedures.

When talking about migration into Germany one also has to illuminate the side of the native population and their reaction towards the newcomers. Because unfortunately it can be stated that xenophobic and racist assaults have increased clearly in 2015 and 2016. When numbers in migrations decreased in 2017 again, these numbers went down too, nevertheless they are still higher than any time before 2015. Besides this, the crimes committed by migrants have gone up, even when statistics consider that some offences can only be committed by foreigners. One reason behind this is definitely the high number of young men who are more likely to be delinquent in all groups of origin but are overrepresented in the group of newcomers.

So overall, it can be concluded that Germany has a long history of migration with different

policies addressing different circumstances during the course of time. Mostly these policies tried to address the recent shortcomings as well as social and political developments but often lag behind, have room for improvement and receive a lot of criticism from non-governmental actors. Additionally, European politics cannot commit to one goal, e.g. agree upon Dublin IV. Thus, European migration issues still pose a big European wide policy problem which translates into national disputes.

After the EU-Turkey-deal the situation of the ‘Summer of Migration’ calmed down for Europe superficially but it is hard to say how long this may stand. Therefore, questions of migration, asylum and integration will probably shape the German political landscape controversially also in the years to come.

Norms and policies on immigration in Italy

In the 1980s, Italy found itself transformed from a country of emigrants — providing a larger number of immigrants to the Americas in the late 19th and early 20th centuries than any other European country — to a net receiver of immigrants. This inflow increased during the 1990s. In fact, it was only in 1997 that the balance of remittances became negative.

Prior to the 1980s, Italy did not have any laws to address the legal existence of foreigners. The unique norm was that found in the public security law of 1931, which required foreigners to declare their presence to the authorities. When the country established its first amnesty program for illegal aliens in the late 1980s, immigration policy became a matter of national concern. Since then, several laws have been passed to regulate immigration in Italy.

The first of these laws (no. 943), passed in 1986, regulated immigrants’ access to the labor market. Following the union-led protest in 1989 which forced immigration on the government’s agenda, Law no. 39 (known as the Martelli Law) was passed in 1991 and recognized both the rights and obligations of immigrants. Italy’s first comprehensive immigration legislation was set in motion.

The new law aimed to attract multilateral attention to Italy's growing immigration concerns and to increase "burden-sharing" to help Italy manage its increasingly porous borders. While implementation and enforcement activities were criticized, the law was the government's response to ease public discomfort and deep European skepticism about Italy's ability to manage its long seacoast. This was especially important since other European countries viewed Italy as the unsecured door through which immigrants were entering other European countries.

The main achievements of the Martelli Law were a broad-based amnesty that included employers and the establishment of an annual quota system with input from unions. It is also to be noted that it was during that time that the first (and last) national conference on immigration was held to discuss the phenomenon of immigration in Italy. However, Law no. 39 failed to define a real procedure for legal entry. This slowly led to an increase in illegal immigration because both the Italian economy required a greater number of workers and Italian families a larger number of domestic helpers.

During the 1995-1996 period, the center-right government, under pressure from the anti-immigrant Lega Nord to increase police powers to deport illegal immigrants, passed the Dini Decree. Unions led a demonstration with 150,000 protesters against the threat of increased police powers, which the decree envisaged. The final decree was revised to include an amnesty and its most restrictive aspects dropped.

The bulk of the legislation that currently regulates immigration and integration matters in Italy is the result of two laws. The Single Act no. 286 of July 25, 1998, which was essentially based on Law no. 40 of March 6, 1998, called the Turco-Napolitano Law and Law no. 189 of July 30, 2002, called the Bossi-Fini Law.

In 1998, Italy came under further pressure to restrict illegal immigration in order to become a full member of the Schengen Agreement before the April deadline. The Italian Law no. 40, of March 6, 1998, on immigration and foreigners, which entered into force on March 27, 1998, is a complex and detailed document. The law's objectives were to improve efficiency in managing the flow of

immigrant labor; increase prevention and containment of illegal immigration; and expand measures for effective integration of legal foreigners. The new law also provided annual planning for the immigration flow on the basis of an appropriate quota established by the government. The Turco-Napolitano Law was extremely strict in the matter of prevention and containment of illegal immigration. It dealt not only with new arrivals at the border, but also with those already illegally in the country. All these new restrictive measures had the effect of bringing Italian policy in line with Schengen. The illegal immigration enforcement part of this act was actively pursued and led to an increase in deportations, primarily of other Europeans and Africans.

The Turco-Napolitano Law was the first time that a law was proposed which delineated a procedure to become a legal resident in Italy. Secondly, it also allowed foreigners to come to Italy even before they found employment. Though, this could have reduced dramatically the numbers of illegal immigrants, this aspect of the law was rarely applied due to a fear that other European countries would accuse Italy of being too lax. Another innovation was the law's recognition of immigrants' social rights, including access to health services and family unification. The law separated for the first-time humanitarian and refugee issues from immigration policy matters. It also included an open category for third world immigrants and a reduced waiting period for permanent residency to five years.

Italy's immigration picture changed further with the victory in 2001 of Silvio Berlusconi. Berlusconi's cabinet, which included members from the far-right Lega Nord (which has made its opposition to immigration central to its electoral agenda) and the formerly neofascist National Alliance, has been seeking ways to curtail immigration into Italy and to deploy a range of enforcement and control mechanisms. In August 2002, the government passed legislation to regulate immigration and, in September of that same year, adopted a decree to provide for the regularization of undocumented immigrants already in the country.

The new Law no. 189, also known as the Bossi-Fini Law, amended the 1998 Immigration Act and introduced new clauses. Some of the most significant changes included: immigrant quotas,

mandatory employer-immigrant contracts, stricter illegal immigration deportation practices, amnesty for illegal immigrants who have worked and lived in the country for over three months, and new provincial immigration offices to help manage immigrant worker and family reunification cases. The law also provided for the legalization of two types of irregular immigrants: those employed either as domestic workers and home-helpers or as dependent workers. These individuals could qualify for regularization, provided that they had not received a deportation order.

The Bossi-Fini Law repealed the sponsorship that had been introduced by the Single Act of 1998. The Turco-Napolitano Law had envisaged a job-seeker visa, providing for the allocation of an annual quota of residence permits to foreigners seeking employment in Italy. These potential workers could enter the country sponsored by private individuals, regions, municipalities and associations listed in a register. Sponsors were required to deposit an economic guarantee, offer appropriate accommodation, and pay the contributions for public health insurance.

In contrast, the new law tightened the link between the work contract and residence permit by bringing them together under one single *contratto di soggiorno lavoro* (residence-employment contract). The residence permit for work was made dependent on a combined residence and employment contract. The residence permit was valid only for the same duration as the employment contract and could be for no more than nine months for seasonal workers; no more than one year for temporary workers; and no more than two years for non-temporary workers. Finally, it modified the 1998 law by requiring immigrants to have job contracts before entering Italy. Both trade unions and employers' organizations have criticized aspects of the new legislation, arguing that they could ultimately harm the national economy. Trade unions objected at the new mandatory employment contracts, fearing that they would be simply another barrier to entry and would divert potentially legal flows toward illegal and irregular channels. Employers' organizations were especially opposed to the provision that denied immigrant workers regularization if they had received a deportation order. They noted that many firms that have employed these workers would be left without replacements, especially in regions of high employment. Also, equally affected would be the many

small and medium firms in northern Italy and farms in the south that rely on foreign labor. In addition, the large and growing number of families who depend on Philippine or Sri Lankan home help would feel the impact of this new law.

The Bossi-Fini Law also introduced a linkage between the quota allocated to certain countries and their cooperation in stemming the flow of people at the source. By pursuing this twin-track approach, the Italian government hoped to demonstrate to illegal immigrants that it was not worth taking the risk; and it wanted to make deals with governments of countries from which they set out. However, immigrants were not deterred by a law doubling the length of time that illegal entrants can be held after detention and imprisoning those caught re-entering. The reality is that illegal immigrants usually enter without papers and refuse to give their nationalities, to avoid deportation. Most “expulsions” from Italy, except to Albania, are notional; the expelled simply go underground, or to another European country, after their release from detention.

Other sectors within Italy, however, viewed the new legislation positively. Employers must now sign formal contracts that guarantee immigrant workers housing and return travel expenses, while also fixing wages and length of employment. Furthermore, the stricter visa issuance policy provided for a more selective immigration process, especially for immigrant workers. Those in favor asserted that Law no. 189 provided a major innovation with regard to immigrants’ living standards and ultimately benefited Italy’s business sector by filling their ever-changing needs with a pool of better-qualified immigrants. However, most immigration experts have viewed the Bossi-Fini Law as a restrictive law that denied immigrants some fundamental social rights.

All the above-mentioned progressively more stringent laws and amnesties have been stopgap measures, introduced in an emergency atmosphere. Until now, Italy has failed to design and implement a comprehensive immigration policy that is based on political, economic, social, and demographic realities that take into account the long-term needs of Italy and the benefits that a regulated immigration policy would bring to Italian society.

In addition, providing immigrants’ political and social rights, and assisting them to better

integrate into Italian culture would ensure a more harmonious and secure society. Fortunately, the Italian government can be influenced by both its own regions as well as by the European Union in terms of policy formulation.

Norms and policies on immigration in Netherlands

The Netherlands was once considered a country of emigration, because people often fleeing the high population density¹ and the lack of space, outnumbered those of migrants (Zorlu & Hartog, 2001). The increase in prosperity in the early 1960s reduced emigration and induced new immigration flows at the same time (Ibid.). Migrants who came as workers were considered to be staying in the country temporarily (Leun, 2003, p. 13). During the oil crises of the 1970s, the first attempts were undertaken to put an end to large-scale international immigration, by proclaiming a formal stop to labour immigration (Rath, 2001) (Siegel & Neubourg, A Historical Perspective on Immigration and Social Protection in the Netherlands, 2011). However, many former guest workers did not leave, but settled more permanently, and they brought over family members and began to form families. In the 1980s, the elites of main political parties agreed not to raise immigrant issues, but instead to resolve them through technocratic compromise (Rath, 2001, p. 3) (Callejo, Garcés-Mascreñas, Penninx, & Scholten, 2007). By 2002, one-fifth of the newcomers originated from Turkey, Morocco, Suriname and the Antilles or Aruba and there was also an influx of asylum seekers from countries such as Somalia, former Yugoslavia, Iran and Iraq (ibid). Alongside the implementation of integration policies, in the 1980s and 1990s, more restrictive immigration policies were implemented and enforced regarding labour migration, and later, on family migration and asylum (Callejo, Garcés-Mascreñas, Penninx, & Scholten, 2007).

Policy makers have reacted on a constant migration surplus with a restrictive immigration policy towards selected immigrant groups who are supposed to be a burden for the Dutch welfare

¹ The Netherlands, the most densely populated country in Europe, has a population of seventeen million inhabitants (available at <http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/netherlands-population/>)

system, but let immigrants from developed countries and top managers to enter easily (Callejo, Garcés-Mascareñas, Penninx, & Scholten, 2007); (Zorlu & Hartog, 2001); (Böcker & Clermonts, 1995). There was agreement among the elites of main political parties to resolve immigration issues through technocratic compromise (Rath, 2001, p. 3). Despite the restrictive immigration policy, rising labour shortages in certain sectors induced new discussions about the need for immigrants from time to time. At one point, this discussion was intensified due to the process of ageing (Zorlu & Hartog, 2001). Immigration and integration policies have for the past few years become a top political priority, even taking on a central symbolic importance to the Dutch political establishment. (Bruquetas-Callejo, et. al., 2007)

This article will look at a brief history of the Netherlands on migration, the different international laws on migration that the country is a signatory to and its national laws as well as policies.

History of Migration in the Netherlands

The Netherlands was known for welcoming migrants in the 16th and 17th centuries (Selm J. v., 2019). During the First World War, almost one million Belgians fled to the Netherlands and refugees came in from Germany and Austria. After the Second World War, migrants from Dutch colonial heritage who had been living and working in Indonesia, Suriname and the Caribbean moved to the Netherlands. The people from Dutch Antilles and Aruba, both part of the Netherlands, were (and still are) also considered migrants by the Dutch society. After the war up till the oil crisis in 1974, the Netherlands received guest workers primarily from Mediterranean countries, including Italy, Spain, Turkey, Morocco, and Yugoslavia who ended up staying and brought families from their respective countries or formed families in the Netherlands (Ibid.; Siegel & Neubourg, 2011, p.3).

The oil crisis brought greater restrictions to labour migration, making asylum the only route for migrants (Ibid.). In 1975, large immigration flows occurred after the de-colonisation of Suriname (Zorlu & Hartog, 2001). By 1985, the number of asylum seekers had grown to more than 4,500, and the government changed its approach to humanitarian protection (Selm2019). Immigration due to

family unification and formation became the most important reason for immigration and peaked in 1983 – 1984. Numerous projects on the national and local levels were started to provide better educational opportunities, improved chances on the labour market and access to social housing (previously impossible) (Siegel & Neubourg, 2011, p. 5).

At the end of the 1980's and especially the beginning of the 1990's these migrants were joined by an even bigger flood of asylum seekers (Ibid.). The number of migrants peaked at more than 45,000 in 1998, with a majority of applicants fleeing the Yugoslav wars. However, resettlement arrivals dropped significantly. After managing the significant number of asylum seekers during the 1990s using temporary protection measures, and following the imposition of restrictions, arrivals fell to less than 10,000 in 2004. (Selm J. v., 2019). Some incidents that underlie fears concerning migrants are the post-9/11 fallout across the world, as well as events in the Netherlands, such as the rise and subsequent 2002 assassination of anti-immigration politician Pim Fortuyn and the 2004 murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a Dutch-born Muslim of Moroccan origin. In 2005, the number of migrant students increased significantly, while all other categories reduced in number or remained the same (Adam & Devillard, 2009).

With vast inflows of asylum seekers and migrants in Europe in 2015 and 2016, fuelled in part by the Syrian civil war, asylum-seeker arrivals in the Netherlands rose again, as did overall immigration after a short period of net migration levels below zero. Nearly 44,000 asylum requests were lodged in the Netherlands in 2015—a recent peak, though still fewer than those filed in 1998 (Selm J. v., 2019). Although asylum applications have declined from their recent 2015 high, the number has been trending up, especially for family members of asylum seekers arriving within three months after the application was approved, for at least a limited protection period. In 2015, 13,800 family members arrived, up from 11,815 in 2016 and down from 14,490 in 2017, followed by a marked drop to 6,465 in 2018. Since 2016, Dutch authorities have started very strictly applying evidentiary rules regarding family relationships. This has posed challenges for asylum seekers, particularly Eritreans, for whom access to documents can be very difficult. Some, such as the Dutch

Refugee Council, argue that the application of the rules is not in line with the EU directive on family reunification, which states that an application for family reunification cannot be denied solely on the basis of insufficient documentation (Selm J. v., 2019).

The restrictive immigration policy also creates a population of undocumented migrants. These migrants become illegal after the refusal of their request for refugee status or they enter the Netherlands legally, then overstay their visit, or they enter illegally without applying for legal residence status at all (Zorlu & Hartog, 2001) (Engbersen, Leun, Staring, & Kehla, 1999). They earn an informal income for unskilled, dirty, unattractive low-paid manual jobs in labour intensive sectors and the famous *gedoogbeleid* (tolerated non-compliance) solves the problem when undocumented labour is in high demand (Zorlu & Hartog, 2001). More day-to-day concerns of some that jobs might be taken by migrants willing to work for lower wages, or that the welfare system might be abused, add to these anxieties (Selm J. v., 2019). This is also fuelled by prominent politicians who espouse anti-immigrant rhetoric² (Selm J. v., 2019).

International and National Laws and Policies on Migration in the Netherlands

The international normative framework on international migration includes instruments pertaining to the human rights of migrants and the rights of migrant workers, and the protection of refugees as well as instruments designed to combat migrant smuggling and human trafficking (Division, 2013)

(<https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/migration/migrationreport2013/Chapter3.pdf> p. 19, n.d.). The Netherlands is signatory to most international conventions that affect the rights of migrants and refugees.³ However, it is yet to sign the International Convention on

² Geert Wilders, the leader of the far-right Freedom Party (PVV), which captured the second-largest number of seats in Parliament in the 2017 election, and the more recent alt-right star, Thierry Baudet (available at <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/migration-netherlands-rhetoric-and-perceived-reality-challenge-dutch-tolerance>).

³ 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees; 1949 ILO Convention concerning Migration for Employment (Revised 1949) (No. 97); 1975 ILO Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) (No. 143); 2011 ILO Convention concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers (No. 189);

the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990) and the ILO Migrant Workers Convention (No. 143). As far as EU law is concerned, the Netherlands is bound by The Long-Term Residents Directive which creates a permanent status for long-term residents and provides such persons with certain rights equal to those of nationals (Long-Term Residents Directive, Art. 8; Art. 11). This directive also requires that third-country nationals comply with integration conditions established under national law (Art. 5[2]). Many higher-level policy changes depend on external as much as internal factors, although how policy is implemented and the precise handling of immigration and asylum cases, as well as integration approaches remain national, sovereign matters and very much in the Dutch government's hands (Lottum, 2009).

In fact, neither research nor policy in the Netherlands spoke of immigrant 'integration' until the 1990s. Before then, terminology referred to emancipation, the eventual return of temporary migrants or 'international commuters'. (Scholten, 2011, p. 20). Since the 1990s, the meaning of integration has remained contested. In addition, migrants have been defined inconsistently over the years – as guest labourers, as ethnic or cultural minorities, as allochthonous or as newcomers and 'oldcomers' (Ibid.). These diverging interpretations have contributed to a series of shifts in Dutch immigrant integration policies in recent decades (Entzinger 2005). Until about the 1970s, only ad hoc welfare measures existed for temporary migrants. The policy in the 1970s was aimed at preventing integration so as to facilitate return migration. (Scholten, 2011, citing Snel & Scholten 2005). In the 1980s there was a minorities policy, which provided various facilities to groups, the 1990s saw an integration policy, which instead focused on individual migrants. Since 2000, there has been a shift towards an integration policy 'new style' whose emphasis is much more on the cultural adaptation of immigrants to Dutch society (Callejo, Garcés-Mascreñas, Penninx, & Scholten, 2007). In addition, integration policy became clearly linked to immigration policy and facilitated the selection of migrants and restricted new flows, in particular those of asylum seekers, family reunion and marriage

migration (Ibid., p. 20).

In 2001, the government tightened the access to asylum through an administrative action linking all social economic data-bases electronically allowing the authorities to identify and allocate illegal or irregular immigrants whenever they would use the administration, health services, schools or parts of the social security administration. The so-called “Linkage Act” made it easier for the administration to identify the irregular asylum cases. It also discouraged irregular asylum seeking by making access to the social system of the country more difficult. The combination of the more legal restrictions, a faster procedure and the linkage seem to have led to a serious drop in the number of asylum seekers (Siegel & Neobourg, 2011, p. 6).

A trend can be noted towards inclusion of integration-related requirements as general conditions in national legislation, particularly over the last few years. “As of 15 March 2006, with some exceptions, every person between the ages of 16 and 65 who wishes to reside in the Netherlands for a prolonged period and is required to apply for an authorization for temporary stay (MVV - *Machtiging tot Voorlopig Verblijf*) must take the civic integration examination abroad. This test is an oral examination consisting of a language test and questions regarding Dutch society. Questions concerning Dutch lifestyle, geography, transport, history, constitution, democracy, legislation, language and the importance of learning it, parenting, education, healthcare, work and income may be asked.” (Adam & Devillard, 2009)

In the Netherlands, the civic integration examination applies: during an oral examination, applicants must answer questions regarding Dutch society to show their civic knowledge⁴ (Ibid.) (Adam & Devillard, 2009). On the other hand, the Netherlands requires that the potential immigrant learns the language on top of acquiring civic knowledge whilst still abroad; otherwise no residence permit will be granted. It has to be reiterated that the condition is of a general nature and hence applies, in principle, to all immigrants. Questions about the Dutch lifestyle, geography, transport, history,

⁴ Language skills are tested in the same examination.

constitution, democracy, legislation, language and the importance of learning it, parenting, education, healthcare, work and income may be asked. The test must be taken at a Dutch embassy or Consulate abroad and successful completion is a prerequisite for the granting of a temporary permit.⁵ The fee for taking the exam is €350 (Adam & Devillard, 2009).

It can be seen from the above that the Netherlands attaches most importance to knowledge of the country's language, politics and culture. Fulfilment of this condition requires, in most cases, that the potential immigrant invests money, time and effort into acquiring the demanded knowledge. If the potential immigrant comes from a rural area and/or developing country, this requirement becomes even more onerous. The condition hence constitutes an important obstacle to immigration. The integration monitor 2006 showed a decrease of MVV, which is most likely the result of the mandatory integration test abroad (TK 2006/07, No. 39; see also Country Report Netherlands).

National legislation in the Netherlands distinguishes between family reunification (where the family ties already existed abroad) and family formation (where the family is only formed through the immigration process and did not exist abroad beforehand).⁶ In 2015, 13,800 family members arrived, up from 11,815 in 2016 and down from 14,490 in 2017, followed by a marked drop to 6,465 in 2018. Since 2016, Dutch authorities have started applying very strict evidentiary rules regarding family relationships. This has posed challenges for asylum seekers, particularly Eritreans, for whom access to documents can be very difficult. Organizations like the Dutch Refugee Council argue that the application of the rules is not in line with the EU directive on family reunification, which states that an application for family reunification cannot be denied solely on the basis of insufficient documentation (Selm, 2019). In 2012 the VVD-PvdA (Labor Party) coalition government established a Children's Amnesty (Kinder Pardon) regulation, in essence amnesty for children who had lived

⁵ Some people are exempted from this trajectory, including highly skilled migrants, people from Turkey or Switzerland, those over the age of 67, people who have lived in the Netherlands for 8 years or longer while under the age of 18, and people who have completed certificates or diplomas in the Dutch language from a Dutch educational institute. Also, if the municipality decides that someone does not have to participate in the trajectory or when someone is psychologically or physically unable to participate, s/he may be exempt, according to the Dutch Integration Act (Dutch Integration Act: <http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0020611/2018-07-28>).

⁶ For example, the marriage takes place in the Netherlands.

without legal status in the Netherlands for five or more years. Although the regulation on paper was sufficient to regularize the status of families in this situation, very few in reality achieved legal status, as a 2017 report by the Children's Ombudsman detailed (Selm, 2019). A new regulation was formed after a public outcry over two children whose asylum was rejected after their mother who had mental health issues had been deported. With the regulation, the resettlement program was dialled back from 750 places to 500 in February 2019 (Ibid.).

The Netherlands has also adopted the condition of an obligatory health assessment for immigrants, applied only to check for certain conditions (for example, tuberculosis) which are considered to endanger public health by national legislation. (Adam & Devillard, 2009) According to Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (2008), all persons (legally) residing in the Netherlands are required by law to be insured under the National Insurance Schemes. All persons who work in the Netherlands and, consequently, pay income tax, are also insured. Apart from National Insurance Schemes, there are also social provisions that supplement insufficient (family) incomes, bringing them up to the minimum guaranteed income level for a particular domestic situation⁷ (Siegel & Neoubourg, 2011, p. 7). While in theory, all legal immigrants in the Netherlands have access to these provisions, in practice, non-permanent residents have little access to social provisions. People residing in the Netherlands illegally have no entitlement to these benefits either (Ibid., p. 8).

Asylum seekers in the Netherlands who have not received an official refugee status can work 24 weeks per year if they have a permit (TWV).⁸ This permit can be applied for if an asylum application is in process for at least 6 months. Asylum seekers cannot work in the first 6 months after their asylum application. The process of the TWV is issued by the Institute of Labour Security (UWV),⁹ which also checks if the employer pays enough to the asylum seeker. Besides being able to

⁷ The main social provisions are the Supplementary Benefits Act, the Wajong (Disablement Assistance Act for Handicapped Young Persons), the Act on Income Provisions for Older or Partially Disabled Unemployed Persons (IOAW), the Act on Income Provisions for Older or Partially Disabled Formerly Self-employed Persons (IOAZ), the Work and Social Assistance Act (WWB) and the Work and Artist Income Act (WWIK).

⁸ In Dutch: Tewerkstellingsvergunning (TWV).

⁹ In Dutch: Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen (UWV).

find a job, asylum seekers can start their own businesses. Since the asylum seekers are housed and provided with basic resources by the central reception institution for asylum seekers (COA), they have to pay a contribution to COA. They can keep 25% of the earned money, up to a maximum of €185 per month. The asylum seeker is also allowed to work in one of the reception centres (AZC). For cleaning or maintenance work in an AZC, they receive between €0.56 and €1.10 per hour with a maximum of €14 per week (Reisen, Schoenmaeckers and Dillen, 2019, p. 34). As soon as an asylum seeker receives his/her residence permit from the Dutch Integration and Naturalisation Services (IND), (s)he obtains the same rights and duties as Dutch Citizens (Dutch Aliens Employment Act).

From 2013, the government shifted the responsibility for integration from the state to the people themselves, under the slogans of ‘self-reliance’ and ‘self-responsibility’ (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 2013), resulting in a decline in caring and responsible presence of the state. These shifts affected migrants and refugees who suddenly became responsible for their own integration and language programmes. One of the provisions concerns the loans that refugees and migrants have to contract in order to learn the Dutch language. They can contract a loan of up to €10,000 to finance their integration courses (Reisen, Schoenmaeckers and Dillen, 2019, p. 34). In 2020, the new Integration Law will make the refugees’ integration the responsibility of the municipality the refugee is residing in. The aim is to start with participating or working in Dutch society in order to learn and understand the Dutch system via a natural way. Additionally, the contested loan will be removed and financial sanctions will be mitigated (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 2018).

In 2017, the government introduced legislation for migrants to follow the mandatory integration trajectory when they arrive in the Netherlands (Regulation Integration act/art. 3.3). This “participation trajectory” requires participants to learn about core values as stated in the Dutch constitution and then sign the “declaration of participation” in which they acknowledge understanding these core values and state that they will respect them and actively contribute to Dutch society (Reisen, Schoenmaeckers and Dillen, 2019, p. 31).

The Netherlands provides international students with the opportunity to study at an institution of higher education (HBO or UE), so long as the institution has signed the Code of Conduct.¹⁰ (Overmars & Hendriks-Cinque, 2012). The admission of international students is considered to be an opportunity to contribute positively to the development of the countries of origin (Aliens Act Implementation Guidelines 2000, Part B, Chapter 6, Section). The student needs to comply with the admission requirements as set out in the Dutch Higher Education and Research Act (Wet op het hoger onderwijs en wetenschappelijk onderzoek, WHW).¹¹ (Ibid.) Furthermore, to be granted entry into the Netherlands, the student must subsequently comply with the conditions as specified in the Aliens Act and proficiency in English is a compulsory requirement (Ibid., pp. 21-22).

Third-country nationals (except countries that are exempted)¹², including students, who wish to enter the Netherlands for a longer period of time must apply for a Regular Provisional Residence Permit (MVV) at a Dutch diplomatic or consular representation abroad before travelling to the Netherlands. An MVV is a visa for a stay longer than 90 days (Type D visa). The MVV, which is valid for ninety days, grants entry into the Netherlands and enables the applicant to apply for a residence permit for an intended stay for more than three months. The criteria for the MVV and the residence permit for the purpose of study correspond with the Articles 6 and 7 of the Directive 2004/114/EC. The third-country national must first satisfy a number of general conditions, as laid down in Section 16 of the Aliens Act. These conditions include that the third-country national does not pose a threat to public order or national security and that he has sufficient means of existence¹³ (Ibid., p. 24). The student must also sign a Declaration of Intent stating that he is willing to undergo

¹⁰ The Code of Conduct for International Students in Higher Education requires educational institutions to give reliable and accessible information on study programmes, admission requirements and rules and procedures for international students (p. 21).

¹¹ With regard to the entry of international students, the Sections 7.25, 7.26, 7.28, and 7.29 of the WHW apply

¹² This is provided in Section 17 of the Aliens Act, Schedule 2 to Article 2.2 of the Aliens Regulations.

¹³ With regard to international students, sufficient means of existence means that they can pay for their studies and living expenses in the Netherlands independently. For the academic year of 2019, the standard for a student attending higher education is €882.47 a month and is exclusive of tuition fee(https://ind.nl/Paginas/normbedragen-inkomenseis.aspx#Verblijfsvergunning_studie).

a TB test upon arrival in the Netherlands¹⁴ (Ibid.).

When it comes to migrant students within the Netherlands, debates revolve around Islamic and weekend schools. “An Islamic foundation in Amsterdam opened a secondary school in 2017, after a fraught permitting process, but in accordance with Dutch freedom of education laws and receiving Amsterdam City Council subsidies. In 2019 the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism warned the City Council that pupils at the school were being influenced by teachers who are in contact with terrorists, causing subsidies to be frozen” (Ibid.). Some Syrian parents established weekend schools to teach their children the language and culture of Syria. These schools are not under Dutch government supervision, therefore raise fears that these schools are also teaching religion and the Islamic cause in such a way as to influence these children towards potential terrorism, and also hamper the integration of the children into Dutch society (“although there are no similar concerns for the thousands of Dutch weekend schools worldwide, which teach the language and culture to children either of families who will/might return to the Netherlands or who have Dutch heritage”) (Ibid.).

Conclusion

The history of the Netherlands has long been marked by significant immigration and emigration, and both look set to continue. The culture of the country keeps changing from one of openness and tolerance to intolerance of newcomers. In the early years of migration, social protection was limited for migrants since they were intended to return to their country of origin. Once it became clear that many migrants were in the Netherlands to stay it became increasingly clear that they would also need access to social protection. The main categories of arrivals in recent years have been family migrants, asylum seekers, and European Union citizens. Contemporary debates have centred on topics such as dealing with children who have lived in the Netherlands in irregular status, limiting asylum-seeking arrivals while doing more through education, including education in Islamic schools and

¹⁴ Persons exempted from this requirement are listed in the Aliens Act Implementation Guidelines 2000, Part B, Chapter 1, Section 4.5 Examples of persons who are exempted are nationals from the EU/EEA, where TB rarely occurs.

weekend schools, and flowing from all this, the nature of Dutch society. A crucial question concerns how the future will develop in the laws, politics and policies and whether approaches to immigration and integration will be less symbolic and more problem-solving.

Norms and policies on immigration in Portugal

1. From country of emigration to country of immigration

Historically, until the 1970s, Portugal was, above all, a country of emigration, mainly towards Brazil in the first two decades of the twentieth century. In the 1960s and 1970s the main destination was Europe and France in particular. This last process was carried out, predominantly, with the emigrants and political exiles, crossing the borders from Portugal to Spain and from Spain to France "a salto" (jumping), that is to say, in an illegal way.

With the revolution of the 25th of April 1974, which ended the fascist regime which ruled since 1933, with the independence of its former colonies, a third, but not privileged emigration destination. Portugal had to face what is considered one of the greatest processes of postcolonial return (Pires & Silva, 1987). Between 1975 and 1976, about 500,000 people, known as "retornados" (returnees), arrived to Portugal.

Since the 1980s Portugal became also a country of immigration, initially with populations from the former colonies: Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and Timor. Since the nineties there was a diversification of countries of origin, namely from Africa, Brazil and European countries. If decolonization was the major reason for the migrations of the 1970s and 1980s, joining the European Union in 1986 and the increase in public expenditure on infrastructures led to the need for manpower. Most of these immigrants remained in Portugal illegally, a situation reversed in regularization processes that occurred in 2001 and 2004.

The asylum status was implemented in Portugal in the 1975 Constitution, but only in 1980 was the first asylum law, later amended in 1993 and renewed in 2008. Successive asylum laws progressively incorporate European Union legislation, including the Dublin agreements and

Schengen. However, comparing to other European nations, the number of asylum seekers in Portugal is relatively insignificant, with asylum concessions being also small. In 1993, the asylum law defines humanitarian status for situations of escape that do not fall within the provisions of the 1951 Geneva Convention, supplemented since 1993 by the designation of humanitarian status. Since 2015, Portugal has received 1,520 refugees who have been relocated under the European resettlement program and is currently developing a more sustainable refugee relocation program (Sousa & Costa, 2017).

In 2017 the foreign population was 416,682 individuals, corresponding to about 4.1% of the population living in Portugal (Catarina & Gomes, 2018). However, as mentioned by Catarina and Gomes (2018), Portugal is among the European Union countries with the lowest percentage of foreign inhabitants and, given the increase in emigration, especially in recent years, the country has a double feature, of emigration / immigration. However, it is interesting to note that the social perception of the number of foreigners is much higher, as demonstrated by the recent PASSDA study in which respondents consider this percentage to be 25%. The same study indicates that Portugal was the country where the biggest change was made towards opening up to immigration, followed by the United Kingdom. Hungary and Poland registered the opposite direction, with the greatest increase in the rejection of immigrants.

2. The political relevance of immigration and integration policies

The immigration phenomenon is a subject that did not get a particular political attention during the seventies and eighties. Only in the 1990s did immigration become relevant in Portuguese society. However, there is a lack of a consistent integration policy, mitigated in the educational field with the first projects of multicultural education, later entitled intercultural education. An Interdepartmental Commission for the Integration of Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities (Comissão Interdepartamental para a integração de imigrantes e minorias étnicas) was established in 1993 with the aim of opposing xenophobia and discrimination and addressing social measures for immigrant communities.

Institutionally, it was only in the beginning of the 21st century that immigration became a

political issue with the creation in 2002 of the High Commissariat for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities – ACIME (Alto Comissariado para a Imigração e Minorias Étnicas), which in 2007 was designated as the High Commissariat for Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue – ACIDI (Alto Comissariado para a Imigração e Diálogo Intercultural), which in 2014 was renamed, once again, the High Commissariat for Migrations - ACM (Alto Comissariado para as Migrações). The operational work of this institute derived from the creation in 2004 of the National Centers for Support to the Integration of Migrants -CNAIM (Centros Nacionais de Apoio à Integração de Migrantes). Since 2007, there is a concern to design national plans for the integration of immigrants and, later, municipal plans for municipalities with a high proportion of immigrants (Horta and Oliveira, 2014). In 2016, the Local Support Centers for the Integration of Migrants (CLAIM) are created at a more local level. In the same year, as a result of developments arising from the "crisis" of refugees in Europe and the response to the refugees relocated to Portugal, ACM acquires competence in this field, reconfiguring and adapting services, in particular the National and Local Centers for Support to the Integration of Migrants (CNAIM and CLAIM), to support the refugees.

According to the Migrant Integration Policy Index of 2015, Portugal ranks 2nd among the 38 countries analysed with 75 points. With the best results in mobility in the labour market (91 points), family reunion (88 points), anti-discrimination (88 points), access to nationality (86 points) and political participation (74 points). The lowest indicators are related to health (43 points), education (62 points) and permanent residence (68 points).

In another recent study, the Integration of Immigrants in the European Union, promoted by Eurobarometer 469 (2018), examined this issue in 28 countries. According to this study, 77% of

Portuguese respondents consider that the integration of immigrants in their region was a success (the European average is 54%), a figure that reaches only 73% when applied to the country.

Among Portuguese respondents, 69% consider that the government is doing enough to promote integration while for 85% to promote the integration of immigrants is a necessary long-term investment for the country. About 57% of Europeans feel comfortable with immigrants, with the

average in Portugal (alongside the Netherlands) being 79% (only supplanted by Spain (83%), Sweden (80%) and Ireland (80%).

On the other side, 30% of Portuguese consider very important to have educational qualifications and training to find work. Portugal is the country where immigrants having friends with Portuguese nationality is considered to be irrelevant (7%). The Portuguese respondents, however, consider that difficulties in finding a job are the main obstacle to integration (82%), while the European average is 63%. This obstacle is only overcome by difficulties in accessing long-term residence permits (92%), with the European average being 55%.

71% consider access limited (European average 53%) and 91% agree that immigrants have the same rights in access to education, health and social protection (European average 79%). The difficulty in bringing the family is also seen as an essential obstacle. Portugal is the country where this is considered most relevant with 75% (European average 47%). The opposite is true in the provision of language courses. Only 30% of respondents consider this to be relevant (along with Poland), at the end of the list (European average 53%). The enrolment of children of immigrants in preschool is considered by 97% as essential, with Portugal being the country with the lowest rate of disagreement in this matter (2%).

Paradoxically, Portugal is the country where the obligation to make integration programs and compulsory language courses gets less agreement, with only 29% (European average 51%, with Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden at the top).

The same source indicates that the promotion of integration through interaction between citizens of the host country and immigrants in schools and in the neighbourhood is approved by 94%. However 90% agree that information on immigration and immigrants should be provided to local communities (European average 81%). Similarly, providing integration measures, such as language courses and information on the country of destination before arrival, is approved by 90% (European average 78%).

At the political level, 70% agree on the possibility of granting immigrants the right to vote in

local elections. The promotion of better cooperation between the different actors responsible for integration is considered very important and important by 92% of the respondents (European average 85%).

On whether the responsibility of the success of the integration depends on the host society and the immigrants, or on each of the parties separately, in the Portuguese case 83% consider that it depends on both (only supplanted by Luxembourg with 85%) – Europe average 69%. In this area, Portugal and Luxembourg are also the countries that least impute to immigrants' total responsibility for their integration (11%) - Europe average 20%.

Regarding the importance of local and regional authorities, in the Portuguese case, 97% of respondents consider it very important and important. The importance of employers is 97% (Europe average 88%). The role of citizens in the success of integration is 96% (Europe 88%). The importance of the media is 90%, although of these only 34% is very important (Europe average 83%). It is interesting to cross this dimension with the way immigrants are represented in the media. In Portugal 52% are presented objectively (Europe average 39%), although it is one of the countries that thinks that the negative representation is lower (17%).

The role of the civil society (93%) is very important and important, while the European average is 82%. The role assigned to the European institutions is 93%, of the highest among the countries analysed (Europe average 80%).

According to this Eurobarometer study of 2018, Portugal is, in the European context, closer to the concerns and opinions of the countries of Northern Europe than to the countries of the Mediterranean.

3. Education policies and foreign university students in Portugal

In Portugal, legislative production on the integration of immigrant students has focused essentially on the so-called mandatory education: the first, second and third cycles of primary and secondary education since the end of the 1980s. Legislation aimed at immigrant students in higher

education is more recent.

The integration in Portuguese schools by immigrant students from the migrant flows of the 1980s led to the creation of the Coordinating Secretariat for Multicultural Education Programs in 1991, later called the Entreculturas Secretariat, which implemented the Intercultural Education Project (1993-1997). Also in 1993, the Association of Teachers for Intercultural Education (APEDI) was created, reflecting the interest that civil society and educators in particular felt about the theme. In 2004, the Entreculturas Secretariat was integrated into the High Commission for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities (ACIME, current High Commission for Migration, ACM). Intercultural education and the training of teachers and socio-educational agents are promoted and pedagogical materials are produced in this field. In 2012 the project "Intercultural School seal" is created, which distinguishes schools that promote, recognize and value diversity (Horta and Oliveira, 2014).

The Plans for the Integration of Immigrants, which began in 2007, included measures to ensure equal opportunities and access to education. Since 2015, the Strategic Plan for Migration (2015-2020) has consolidated programs for the learning of Portuguese as a non-native language, the promotion of intercultural education in schools, and educational measures that promote educational success and reduce drop-out rates. In 2016, the Network of Schools for Intercultural Education was created, a partnership between ACM, the Directorate General of Education and the Aga Khan Portugal Foundation. The OECD, in the Program for International Student Assessment, distinguishes Portugal as one of the countries with the most positive evolution in the integration of students of immigrant origin (PISA, 2016).

In the context of higher education, only in 2014 is the status of the international student established (Decree-Law no. 36/2014, of 10 March). The recruitment of students and international researchers included in Law no. 63/2015, of June 30, brought changes in residence visas for the purpose of scientific research for non-citizens. It is estimated that there are currently 42,000 foreign students coming from 167 countries, this corresponds to 12% of students in higher education, which is, in the OECD context, a minor rate (Observatory, 2017).

In the aftermath of the war in Syria, Jorge Sampaio, former President of the Republic, founded the Global Academic Assistance Platform for Syrian Students in 2013 with the objective of supporting Syrian students in their integration in universities, in Portugal and in others countries. In Portugal, since 2014, 64 students have been received and 16 others have been supported in Lebanon and dozens in other neighbouring countries of Syria and throughout the world.

Norms and policies on immigration in Turkey

The total of foreigners living in Turkey today is 5.5 million. Yet, migration into and out of Turkey has a long history. Although Turkey is known as an emigration country since the 1960s, it became a destination and transit hub in the last 25 years for forced migrants from the Balkans and the Middle East.. In the early 1980s, almost 1.5 million of Iranians arrived in Turkey after the regime change, most of them finding a way to resettle in the Global North. In 1988, 51,542 people came from Northern Iraq; in 1989, 345.000 people of Turkish descent came from Bulgaria; in 1991, almost half million came from Iraq following the Gulf War I; between 1992 and 1998, 20.000 Bosnian Muslims arrived due to ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia; in 1999, 17.746 Kosovars came in the aftermath of the tragic incidents; in 2001, 10.500 people came from Macedonia.¹⁵ While most of them either found a way to go westward or repatriated, some of them stayed in Turkey. More recently, due to failing states, political upheavals and civil wars, Turkey has *de facto* turned into a country hosting the highest number of refugee population in the world since 2015. The major and most unprecedented refugee flows took place in 2011 when Syrians had to flee from the civil war. Since then, the number of Syrians under temporary protection reached more than 3.7 million in the country.¹⁶ 96% of all Syrians live in urban and semi-urban areas. There are also Syrians staying in Turkey with residence permits – their numbers as of early 2020 has reached almost 100.000. These are definitely people

¹⁵ http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik/history-of-migration_915_1026

¹⁶ http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/temporary-protection_915_1024_4748_icerik

with more resources belonging to higher socio-economic status. By early 2020, there were more than 4 million refugees and asylum seekers registered in Turkey, almost half of them are children (1.7 million Syrians and 120,000 other nationalities). While Syrians are given temporary protection in Turkey, the rest of the refugees (mainly Afghans, Iraqis, Somalis and Iranians) are under international protection. Although Turkey is a signatory of the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees, it still one of the four remaining countries maintaining the geographical limitation – remnant of the Cold War era – which was lifted with the 1967 Protocol. This means, Turkey does not accept *de jure* refugees coming outside of Europe. Therefore, there is a permanent ‘temporariness’ which makes the situation of many asylum seekers and refugees more vague, thus rendering their lives difficult to cope with and leaving them in limbo. Yet, compared with other Middle Eastern countries with large numbers of refugees, such as Iran, Jordan and Lebanon, their higher numbers suggest that Turkey is still a better alternative for many.

Turkey has become also a destination country for economic migrants since the 1990s mainly coming from Central Asia and former Soviet Republics but also as far as the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand. also flows of economic migrants from former Soviet Republics since the 1990s due to wage differentials, economic opportunities in Turkey especially in the service sector and live-in maids in neo-liberal economy. This is a result of feminization of migration while many female migrants are in demand due to shortages in labour markets in neo-liberal economy. In addition to economic migrants and forced migrants, Turkey continues to serve as a transit country. Many of them are risking their lives as well as lives of their children in perilous journeys to seek protection in the EU. In 2018 only, two years after the signature of EU-Turkey Statement to curb irregular flows, nearly 32,500 refugees and migrants crossed the sea borders to reach shores of Greece, while 18,000 crossed the land borders. In 2019, apprehensions of irregular migrants reached a highest peak with more than 464.000 coming from 173 different countries. Migrant smuggling is also prevalent in the region as 9.000 migrant smugglers were arrested in 2019. As for the number of foreigners coming to Turkey for the purposes of studying, working and for investment, almost 2.5 million persons were granted

residence permits in the last 13 years.¹⁷ The number of international students is also on the rise making Turkey 9th place as a hub for tertiary education in the world.

Number of International Students in Turkey

Turkey has 112 state (public) and 74 foundation (private) universities and vocational schools with more than 7.5 million Turkish and international students during the 2017-2018 academic year.¹⁸ Turkey has recently started to attract large numbers of international students especially in the higher education. According to YÖK (Turkish Council of Higher Education) data, the number of international students has increased gradually while sending countries diversified at the same time:

Table 1: International Students in Turkey

YEAR	Number of Int. Students
2012-13	42,000
2013-14	56,000
2014-15	82,000
2015-16	114,000
2016-17	120,000
2017-2018	128,000

These numbers are still very humble considering that the number of international students across the world is expected to reach 10 million in 2025. While international students come from 180 different countries, major countries of origin in Turkey are Central Asian Republics, Africa and Asia, as well as Eastern European countries – including the Balkans.¹⁹ Over 70% of all international students are currently enrolled at the undergraduate level. One of the reasons in the increase of international students is “Turkey Scholarships” granted by Turkish Prime Ministry’s Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB). The other reason is some countries, such as Iran and Pakistan, give state scholarships to their students to pursue degrees outside their country of origin at the graduate level. Private universities, including Koç University – with language of instruction in English – also compete at the international level to attract gifted students not only from the global north but also from Asia, especially India and China.

Turkish Education System and the Syrian Refugees in Turkish schools

Public schools in Turkey are either free of charge or with minimal fees and the instruction of language is Turkish. There are also many private schools in Turkey starting from the kindergarten level up to elementary and secondary levels usually with quite high tuition rates. In accordance with the Turkish laws, compulsory or basic education is 12 years which is divided into three levels of 4 years of schooling at each level – elementary, middle school, and high school. School-age children of foreign nationals, including those under temporary and international protection, can be enrolled at public schools in Turkey which is free of cost.

For Syrian children, there are two options to get basic education at the moment. The first one is Temporary Education Centers (with curricula in Arabic and some Turkish) and the second one is Turkish public schools. The majority of Syrian children are enrolled in Turkish public schools since

¹⁷ http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik/history-of-migration_915_1026

¹⁸ <https://www.dailysabah.com/education/2018/04/28/turkeys-universities-host-75-million-students>

¹⁹ <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/education/over-100-000-international-students-study-in-turkey/1148030>

2016.²⁰ The year 2016 was a turning point in terms of basic education services for Syrian children as the Turkish government launched a program together with the EU-funding called *PICTES* (Promoting Integration of Syrian Children into the Turkish Education System). This initiative, alongside many others by the Turkish Ministry of National Education, the Turkish Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services, and the Red Crescent put forward, such as *Conditional Cash Transfer for Education* for refugee children, played an important role in the increase of schooling rates of Syrian children in Turkey. By the end of 2018, the number of Syrian and other refugee children at Turkish schools reached more than 645,000. However, UNICEF reports that there are at least 400,000 Syrian school-age children outside schools.²¹ Another problem is the high drop-out rates as children get older. For example, while it is as high as 96% at elementary school, it drops to 58% for middle school and 26% for high school. There are gendered reasons for dropping out at the secondary level. It is usually early/child marriages and cultural reasons for girls and the need to help family finances and thereby engaging in child labour for boys.

As for higher education, there are currently more than 27,000 Syrian students in Turkish universities, out of whom 61% are men and 39% are women. In Turkey, admission to universities is quite competitive that all students are subject to take a university entrance exam. In addition to university-level requirements, Syrians under temporary protection and those with residence permits are also taking tests that is necessary for foreign nationals. Tuition fees for Syrian students are covered by YTB for public universities. Access to basic education and higher education of Syrians are extremely important not to have lost generations. There are already a large Syrian refugee population in Turkey who are either illiterate or with very little formal education. Furthermore, UNICEF reports that 5.3 million children within Syria and over 2.5 million children outside Syria – 1.7 million living in Turkey – are adversely affected.²²

Number of International Students at Koç University

The number of the international students studying full time at Koç University in the 2018-2019 academic year (excluding exchange students) is **465**.

Table 2: Countries of Origin (International Students only)

Country Labels	Count of Citizenship (incl TR citizenship)		Country Labels	Count of Citizenship (not including TR citizenship)
TUR	6636		IRN	101
IRN	101		USA	53
USA	53		AZE	48
AZE	48		PAK	48
PAK	48		SYR	23
SYR	23		DEU	21

²⁰ Turkish Ministry of National Education already planned a gradual phase-out of Temporary Education Centers by 2019 and demanded that all Syrian children should be enrolled at Turkish public schools instead as of September 2016. Although the practice was highly contested among some Syrian groups, it was later welcomed as it improved literacy rates and promotes integration for Syrian children.

²¹ UNICEF Humanitarian Report (2018): <https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/unicef-turkey-2018-humanitarian-results>

²² https://www.unicef.org/appeals/files/UNICEF_Syria_Crisis_Situation_Report_Mid_Year_2018.pdf

DEU	21		ITA	10
ITA	10		JOR	10
JOR	10		CYP	9
CYP	9		KAZ	9
KAZ	9		CHN	8
CHN	8		BGR	7
BGR	7		EGY	7
EGY	7		CAN	6
CAN	6		GRC	6
GRC	6		PSE	6
PSE	6		GBR	5
GBR	5		IND	5
IND	5		KKT	5
KKT	5		RUS	5
RUS	5		FRA	4
FRA	4		ALB	3
ALB	3		IRQ	3
IRQ	3		KOS	3
KOS	3		LBN	3
LBN	3		UKR	3
UKR	3		UZB	3
UZB	3		AFG	2
AFG	2		AUT	2
AUT	2		BIH	2
BIH	2		CHE	2
CHE	2		IDN	2
IDN	2		JPN	2
JPN	2		LBY	2
LBY	2		NLD	2
NLD	2		SAU	2
SAU	2		SDN	2
SDN	2		TJK	2
TJK	2		TZA	2
TZA	2		VNM	2
VNM	2		MAR	1
MAR	1		ARM	1
ARM	1		AUS	1
AUS	1		BGD	1
BGD	1		BHR	1
BHR	1		BLR	1
BLR	1		BLZ	1
BLZ	1		BRA	1
BRA	1		CHL	1
CHL	1		ESP	1
ESP	1		HUN	1
HUN	1		ISR	1

ISR	1		KEN	1
KEN	1		KGZ	1
KGZ	1		KOR	1
KOR	1		LBR	1
LBR	1		LVA	1
LVA	1		MAC	1
MAC	1		MDA	1
MDA	1		MKD	1
MKD	1		ROU	1
ROU	1		SGP	1
SGP	1		SWE	1
SWE	1		TCA	1
TCA	1		ZWE	1
ZWE	1		Grand Total	465
Grand Total	7101			

The countries of origin for the highest numbers of international students at Koç University are Iran, USA, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Syria, Germany, Italy, Jordan (see Table 2 above).

The number of the exchange students at Koç University in the 2018-2019 academic year is 189 (See Table 3 below for the number of exchange students in the last two semesters). The countries of origin of the highest numbers of exchange students are the Netherlands, France, Germany, Singapore, India, UK, Canada, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Switzerland (see Table 4 below).

Table 3: Number of Exchange Students

Summer 2018	18
Fall 2018	66
Spring 2019	96
Fall 2018 and Spring 2019	9
Total	189

Table 4: Countries of origin for Exchange Students (short-term)

Countries	Numbers
NLD	29
FRA	15
DEU	12
SGP	12
IND	10
GBR	8
CAN	8
PAK	8
AZE	7

CHE	7
DNK	6
GEO	6
SWE	5
FIN	4
CHN	4
HKG	4
MEX	4
NOR	3
POL	3
ESP	3
IRN	3
JOR	3
PER	3
AUT	2
BRA	2
KGZ	2
TWN	2
USA	2
ISR	2
MAR	2
URY	2
CZE	1
ITA	1
SVN	1
JPN	1
RUS	1
THA	1
Total	189

II. The cross-cultural study

A large corpus of studies has argued about the important role of intergroup contact, referred to as continuous encounters between member's belonging to different groups, in shaping intergroup attitudes of both native and immigrants people. The present research aimed at investigating the effects of positive and negative contact, between immigrants and natives on intergroup attitudes, considering the point of view of both natives and immigrants the countries involved in the Peacemakers project. For the immigrant groups we aimed at investigating the effect of positive and negative contact on perceived hostility from the outgroup, dual identification, that is, identification with both home and

host countries and acculturation attitudes, in terms of culture adoption, culture segregation, personal integration and culture maintenance. For native group we investigate the effects of positive and negative contact on perceived hostility from the outgroup and attitudes towards immigrants.

In the following before reporting the results we outline descriptive findings in terms of demographic data and descriptive results on the items of the survey, for each country and sample

III. Findings of the survey across countries with three subsamples

Survey main results in Germany

Native students

Demographic data

148 German students took part to the survey, all of them from Europe. Of the participants, 43 were males and 102 were females. As expected in a sample composed of students from university, almost all participants are young, most with an age range between 18-20 (33.1%, n=49), 21-23 (20.9%, n=31) and 24-26 (18.2%, n= 27). In line with the age range of the participants, more than half of participants (64.3%, n=92) have at least a high school degree, while 30.1% (n=43) already have a university degree.

The majority of the participants (70.3%, n=104) claimed that they do belong to any religion, while 23.6% (n=35) claimed that they consider their selves as belonging to a religion and 6.1% (n=35) claimed they don't know. Moreover, as expected with a sample of students and considering their young age, almost all students are single (76.4%, n=113), 18.9% (n=28) are married or in domestic relationship, while, 4.8% (n=7) are in another familial status, separated or widow.


When we look at the socio-economic indicators, 39.2% (n= 58) of the participants belong to a good socio-economic situation, while 14.2% (n=21) claimed that they SES was better than most and 2.7% (n= 4) as wealthy. 29.7% (n=44) claimed their socio-economic situation is mediocre, while 11.5% (n=17) claimed their economic situation was worse than most and 2.7% (n= 4) claimed to be

poor.


Intergroup contact

Referring to frequent interactions with immigrants, 37.7% (n=44) of the respondents claimed they had close contact with some immigrants, 26.1% (n= 31) with many, 5% (n= 6) with quite a lot, while 29.4% (n= 35) claimed do have close contact with few immigrant.

When asking of immigrants, they occasionally know, the majority of participants (n=87) either stated that they occasionally meet some migrants, or they have little contact. Moreover, participants were investigated on how much positive and negative interactions they had. More than half of participants claimed they had sometimes, often or very often positive contacts with immigrants, while also more than half claimed they had never few or sometimes negative contacts.




When asked about the nature of information displayed in the Italian mass media about immigrants, almost all participants (79.5%, n=62) claimed that in the last year, Italian mass medias have reported a lot negatives information about immigrants.



Attitudes towards immigrants

Respondents were also asked to express their opinion on how they perceive immigrants' presence in Germany and their impact on German culture and society. The majority of participants (81.3%, n= 65) consider that migrants enrich the culture of a country while 15% (n=12) are undecided. In line with this, more than half of the respondents 71.3% (n=57) does not consider that migrants represent a break on wellness of the country. 21.3% (n= 17) are undecided.



International students

Demographic data

This survey was completed by 62 participants in total: 45 females, 17 males. The vast majority

of participants are mostly between 27-29 (n=18), 30-40 (n=12), 24-26 (n=11), 21-23 (n=10) and 18-23 (n=10). 46.8% of the students (n=29) have a university degree and 40.3% (n=25) have high school degree. of the participants, the ratio of students coming from Europe were the highest (58.1%, n=36), while the other respondents mainly come from Asia (21%, n=13). The ratio of students from America is 8.1% (n=5) while ratio of students coming from Africa is 3.2% (n=2) and 1.6% (n=1) are from America. Furthermore, 6.5% (n= 4) of the respondents claimed they were both European and Asian, while 1.6% (n=1) claimed to be both European and American.


The majority of respondents (62.9%, n=39) claimed that they belong to a religion, while 32.3% of respondents (n=20) stated that they do not believe in any religion.

Most of the participants are living in the host society for more than a year (88.7%, n=55) or at least for 6 months (8.1%, n=5). Moreover, 72.6% (n=45) stated that they are single, while 24.2% (n=15) are married. The language level of most of the respondents is above the average. Indeed, 61.3% (n=38) claimed they language level was very well, while for 21% (n= 13) their language level is well and for 14.5% (n= 5) it is neither well nor poorly. Referring to the socio-economic indicators, we can conclude that participants' economic situation is balanced between good (38.7%, n=24) and mediocre (32.3%, n= 20). 11.3% (n= 7) claimed that their socio-economic situation was better than most, while 11.3% (n= 7) claimed to be poor, and 4.8% (n=3) considered their SES as worse than most.


Intergroup contact

Only 1.6% (n=1) of the respondents stated that they do not have any contact with native people in Germany. However, the majority of the participants have quite a lot (48.4%, n= 30) or many (32.3%, n= 20) close contact with native people. Interestingly, most of participants also claimed they have quite a lot (33.9%, n=21) or many (38.7%, n=24) superficial contacts with natives. Besides, majority of their friends also have contact with at least few native people (22.6%, n=14), while 25.8% (n=16) claimed that some of their friends have native friends, for 32.3% (n=20) many and for 17.7% (n= 11) quite a lot of they friend have native friends. Moreover, data also showed that more than half

of the participants claimed they had often or very often positive contact with natives, while more than half claimed that they had none or few negative contact with natives.





Referring to media's negative coverage of migrants, 64.5% of all respondents (n=40) believed that media generates negative views of migrants.



Acculturation preferences

While migrant students want to know more about local cultures (73,3%, n=22), local people (90%, n=27) and adopt natives lifestyle (73,3%, n= 19) , more than half of them are mitigated on

whether to protect their own cultural heritage and traditions. (example below)



Migrant adults

Survey main results in Italy

Native students

Demographic data

This survey was completed by 68 Italian students, all of them from Europe. Of which 51 males and 17 females. As expected in a sample composed of students from university, almost all participants

are young, most with an age range between 18-20 (54.4%, n=37) and 21-23 (36.8%, n=25). In line with the age range of the participants, almost all participants (92.6%, n=63) have already graduated from high school while 7.4% (n=5) already have a university degree. on the basis of the age of the respondents, we assume that they are in bachelor at the university and have not yet graduated. The major degrees of the participants. The majority of participants study Psychology (66.2%, n=46), at the bachelor's degree, while 11.8% (n=8) are students in economy (Business economy, Economy and finance, Economy and marketing).

The majority of the participants (55.9%, n=28) claimed that they do not follow any religion, while 27.9% (n=19) claimed that they consider their selves as belonging to a religion and 13.2% (n=9) claimed they don't know. Of the participants who claimed they belong to a religion, 29.4% (n=20) claimed they are Roman catholic. As Italy is a Roman catholic country, it was thus expected that the religion mainly professed was Roman catholic. Moreover, as expected with a sample of students and considering their young age, almost all students are single (83.8%, n=57), 2.9% (n=2) are married or in domestic relationship, while, 11.8% (n=8) are in another familial status (Engaged, in a stable relationship).


When we look at the socio-economic indicators, we can conclude that the majority of the participants belong to a good socio-economic situation (63.2%, n=43). 16.2% (n=11) claimed their socio-economic situation is mediocre, while 11.8% (n=8) claimed their economic situation is better than most.

Intergroup contact


The majority of the participants (78 %, n=53) do not have much contact with migrants and/or migrant students. None of them claimed they don't know any migrants. Indeed, 25 participants claimed they have few contacts with migrants, 28 have some contact, 14 have many contacts and only 1 have quite a lot contact with migrants' people.

When asking of migrants they occasionally know, the majority of participants (n=51) either stated that they occasionally meet migrants or they have little or no contact. When assessing the

positive and negative contact experiences with migrants, almost all participants claimed they have had positive experiences on a regular basis while they also claimed that they have had fewer negative interactions with migrants.




When asked about the nature of information displayed in the Italian mass media about immigrants, almost all participants (94.1%, n=64) claimed that in the last year, Italian mass medias have reported a lot negatives information about immigrants.



Attitudes towards immigrants

Respondents were also asked to express their opinion on how they perceive migrants' presence in Italy and their impact on Italian culture and society. The majority of participants (57.6%, n= 46) consider that migrants enrich the culture of a country while 22.1% (n=15) are undecided. In line with this, more than half of the respondents 73.8% (n=57) does not consider that migrants represent a break on wellness of the country. 14.7% (n= 10) are undecided.



Perceived hostility

36.8% (n=25) of respondents claimed that they feel many continuous tensions between immigrants and natives, while 25% (n=17) feel quite a lot tensions, 23.5% (n=16) feel some tensions, 10.3% (n=7) feel few tensions and only 4.4% (n=3) of the respondents does not feel any tensions between immigrants and natives.

International students

Demographic data

This survey was completed by 30 participants in total: 15 females, 15 males. The vast majority of participants are young, mostly between 21-23 (n=8) and 24-26 (n=10). 70% of the students (n=21) have a university degree. Only 23.3% have high school degree.

High school: 23.3% (n= 7), 70% (n= 21), 6.7% (n= 2). The majority of the students are from Europe, with a ratio of 53% (n=16). The ratio of students from Asia is 26.7% (n=8) while ratio of students coming from Africa is 10% (n=3) and 6.7% (n=2) are from America.

The majority of respondents (56.7%, n=17) claimed that they belong to a religion, while 33.3% of respondents (n=10) stated that they do not believe in any religion. The majority of migrant students are Roman Catholic (23.3%, n=7), Islamic and Eastern orthodox (13.3%, n=4).



Most of the participants are living in the host society for more than a year (56.7%, n=17) or at least for 6 months (30%, n=9). only 76.7% (n=23) stated that they are single, while 16.7 (n=5) are married. Moreover, the language level of most of the respondents is at least in the average (Not well at all: 6.7% (n= 2), poorly: 13.3% (n= 4), neither well nor poorly: 26.7% (n= 8), well: 30% (n= 9), 23.3% (n= 7)). Referring to the socio-economic indicators, we can conclude that more than half of the participants belong to higher economic situation (70%, n=21), that is, above average of the sample. Some participants (20%, n=6) noted that their economic situation is So-so, while 6.7% (2) claimed to be poor. Only 1 participant belong to lower economic situation.

Wealthy: 6.7% (n= 2), better than most: 13.3% (n= 4), good: 50% (n= 15), so-so: 20% (n= 6), poor: 6.7% (n= 2), worse than most: 3.3% (n= 1).


Intergroup contact

Only 3.3% (n=1) of the respondents stated that they do not have any contact with native people in Italy. However, the majority of the participants (96.7%, n=28) have close contact with native people. Interestingly, most of participants claimed they have many superficial contacts with natives (40%, n=12). Besides, majority of their friends also have contact with at least few native people (90%, n=27), while 10% (n=3) claimed that none of their friends have native friends.

During their encounters with native people, all respondents stated they had frequent positive interactions with natives. It seems that, during the interactions with natives, all the respondents have had only positive outcomes. Some distribution of the participants responses on the indicators of the quantity of positive and negative contact are displayed bellow.





Referring to media's negative coverage of migrants, 60% of all respondents (n=18) believed that media generates negative views of migrants.



Acculturation preferences


While migrant students want to know more about local cultures (73,3%, n=22), local people (90%, n=27) and adopt natives lifestyle (73,3%, n= 19) , more than half of them are mitigated on whether to protect their own cultural heritage and traditions. It should be questioned whether this is in fact a hindrance for integration, or a wish for more diversity and to live in a multicultural society





Perceived hostility

Moreover, it is important to note that together with having witness of tensions between natives and migrants, participants also feel high tension among migrants and natives (69.9%, $n = 21$). It is important to note that the large part of all respondents (sometimes: 10 (33.3%), often: 10 (33.3%), few times: 7 (23.3%) feel hostility in accessing jobs and social welfare among native and migrant people.



Migrant adults

Demographic data

The survey was completed by 138 migrant people. Of the 138 participants, 83 were males and 55 were females. The participants' age interval was distributed as follow: 2.9% of participants' age ranged between 18-20 (n=4), 10,1% between 21-23 (n=14), 20,3% between 24-26 (n= 28), 22.5% between 27-29 (n= 31), 29% between 30-40 (n= 40), 10.1% between 41-50 (n= 14), 2.9% between 51-60 (n= 4) and 0.7% between 61-67 (n= 1). In this sample, different age range are represented. In fact, 55.8% of participants are aged less than 30 and 42.7% more than 30.

The Italian sample were mainly composed of persons from Africa. In fact, more than 82.6% (n = 114) of the participants is from Africa, 8% from Europe (n= 11), 4.3% from America (n= 6) and 5.1% from Asia (n= 7).

Referring to the religiosity, the large part of the respondents declares to profess a religion. 76.8% of participants claimed that they consider themselves as belonging to a religion (n= 106), 15.9% declare not to professing any religion (n= 22) and 7.2% said they did not know (n= 10). The main religions professed were Islam and Christian religions.


In line with the age range declared by the participants, the large part of participants declares to be single. As the data showed, 59.4% (n= 82) of respondents are single, 28.3% (n= 39), 6.5% (n= 9) are divorced or separated and 3.6% (n= 5) mark to be in other unspecified familial status. Interestingly, the large part of respondents perceives their socio-economic situation as good. In fact, 0.7% (n= 1) of respondents declares to be economically wealthy, 4.3% (n= 6) perceives their socio-economic situation as better than most, 30.40% (n= 45) as good, 19.6% (n= 27) claimed to be poor and 10.9% (n= 15) perceived their economic situation as worse than most.

Referring to the level of instruction, almost all participants have been at least to elementary school. Interestingly, the large part of respondents declares they went to University. As we can see,


only 2.9% (n= 4) of respondents declares not to have any instruction. 4.3% (n= 6) declares they have been to elementary school, 27.8% (n= 37) have been to high school, 55.1% (n= 76) to university, 7.2% (n= 10) to college and 2.9% (n= 4) declares their have had other unspecified type of instruction. Of the participants, 14.5% (n= 20) responds to be self-employed, 34.1% (n= 47) say they are employee, 44.9% (n= 62) declares to be unemployed and 0.7% (n= 1) were retired. Moreover, the large part of the respondents has been living in Italy for more than one year. 17.4% (n= 24) declares they were in Italy for at least 6 months, 2.9% (n= 4) for a year, and 79.7% (n= 110) was in Italy for more than a year. Interestingly, the level of language of large part of the sample is in the average (**M= 3.78 (.952) on a 5 points scale**). This must be due to the time spent in the host society and in contact with the members of the host society. In fact, only 2.2% (n= 3) of the respondents assessed their language level as “Not well at all”. 8% (n= 11) assessed their language level as poor, 21.7% (n= 30) consider their language level as neither well nor poor, 46.4% (n= 64) assessed their language level as good and 46.4% (n= 64) as very good.

Intergroup contact

Since the study were focused on the effects of the contact of migrants with the members of the host society, we first measure the frequency of contact on different level. The frequency of contact was thus measured as intimate contact, superficial contact, indirect contact and perceived contact in the neighbourhood. Referring to intimate contact, participants were asked to indicate how many native people they knew. The large part of the respondents knew at least few members of the host society. 1.4% (n= 2) declares not to know no one, 23.9% (n= 33) declares their known few members of the host society, 28.3% (n= 39) respond they knew well some members of the host society, 30.4% (n= 42) declares to know many host country members and 15.9% (n= 22) quite a lot (**M= 3.36 (1.06)**)




Media impact: completely disagree: 4 (2.9%), disagree: 7 (5.1%), neither agree nor disagree: 18 (13%), agree: 35 (25.4%), completely agree: 73 (52.9%). $M = 4.21 (1.05)$.



Acculturation preferences

34,8% (n=48) show willingness to be part of host country's culture and 38,4% (n= 53) were undecided, while 51% (n=84) would like to sustain their own culture and ways of living and about 26,8% (n= 37) were undecided. For 78,3% of all respondents (n= 108), it seems that preserving their cultural heritage and traditions and for 60,9% of them (n=84), preserving their group lifestyle are important criteria. Interestingly, when it is about knowing native and speaks natives' language, the large part of respondents agreed, but when it is about adopting natives' lifestyle and culture, the

respondents are mitigated, almost half of participants claimed they were undecided (neither agree nor disagree).



The majority of the participants are willing to attend meetings in support of migrants' rights (76%, n=105). 58.7% (n=81) of the participants were willing to participate into peaceful demonstrations in favour of immigrants' right to vote in the host society. However, it is important to note that those participants who 'neither agree nor disagree' to participate into peaceful demonstrations for demanding rights still constitute 30.4% (n=42). Moreover, participants are willing to support a petition for gaining citizenship (70.3%, n=97). However, 21.7% of the participants (n=30) claimed they neither agree nor disagree to such collective action. The data clearly indicate that migrant people in this survey are favourable in taking collective actions aimed at defending migrants'

rights, as a way towards integration into the host country.


Attending meetings in favour of migrants' rights: completely disagree: 2 (1.4%), disagree: 4 (2.9%), neither agree nor disagree: 27 (19.6%), agree: 43 (31.2%), completely agree: 62 (44.9%).

$M = 4.15 (0.94)$

Perceived hostility

It is important to note that together with having witness of tensions between natives and migrants, participants also feel high tension among migrants and natives. The large part of all respondents (n=41) (sometimes: 39 (28.3%), often: 36 (36.1%), always: 40 (29%) feel hostility in accessing jobs and social welfare among native and migrant people. This can suggest that when there is economic downturn and jobs are scarce, migrants unfortunately become the scapegoats in the society.

Feeling of tension between natives and migrants: never: 12 (8.7%), few times: 22 (15.9%), sometimes: 45 (32.6%), often: 30 (21.7%), always: 29 (21%). **$M = 3.3 (1.22)$**



To answer to media's negative coverage of migrants, 78.3% of all respondents (n=108)

believed that media generates negative views of migrants. We are not able yet to say if media plays a role in the perceived acceptance by the host society, but 46.4% (n= 61) of the respondents claimed that immigrants' are not accepted in the host society, while 34.8% (n= 48) is undecided

Survey main results in Turkey

Native students


Demographic data

This survey was completed by 85 participants in total: 44 females, 41 males. As expected in a university setting, the vast majority of participants are young, mostly between 21-23 (n=41) and 18-20 (n=30). More than half of participants (55.29%) are in college at undergraduate level while 38.82% have university diplomas already. We assume that while some of them study university for the second time, it is highly likely due to young age of participants that this question was misunderstood altogether, and they chose university diploma as their last diploma acquired while still studying in college. The majority of participants study at the College of Social Sciences (n=25) (PSYC, HIST, MAVA, ARHA), while there is a high number from different engineering departments (n=24), and 23 students' study at College of Administrative Sciences. Only three participants pursue master's degrees. There are also 7 students from the Law Faculty, one student from the School of Medicine, one in nursing and two from Molecular Biology and Genetics – one out of whom is pursuing master's degree.

Koç University provides a secular environment for students and faculty alike, it is noteworthy that the majority of the participants (49.41%) claimed that they do not follow any religion, while 14.2% do not specify. As Koç University is a private (foundation) university with comparatively higher tuition fees than the rest of the public and other private universities in Turkey, it was expected that students participating in the survey also come from higher-SES and/or above average income families. When we look at the socio-economic indicators, we can conclude that the majority of the participants belong to higher SES (78.82%) – in other words, above average SES. Some participants (20%, n=17) though noted that they come from families with average income. Only 1 participant belong to lower-SES.

Intergroup contact



It is interesting that the majority of the participants from native KU students' group (80 %, n=68) do not have much contact with migrants and/or migrant students. When asked about the frequency of such contacts, the majority of participants (87.06%) either stated that they do not meet migrants on a regular basis or they have little/no contact whatsoever. They either know few or very few numbers of migrants. When asked about "how many of friends are friends of migrants", the majority of them (88.24 %) stated "very few, few or none" respectively. As it is possible to choose multiple answers in Q-14, those who know migrants stated that they know more international students (n=74) than economic migrants (n=52) and refugees (n=42). They usually came to know migrants from Asia (n=68), Europe (n=53), America (n=34), Africa (n=29), Australia (n=6). For native students, the places for meeting with migrants are indicated as the university setting (classrooms, library, at university events/activities). It seems, however, some of the native students also meet students of migrant origin outside the university, such as at cafes, bars, shopping malls, and even parties.




Attitudes towards immigrants

Migrants enriching or endangering the dominant culture? The answers to the questions

whether migrants are enriching the dominant culture or if they pose a threat against host country's life-style and national values are interesting. While 45,88% of all respondents (n=39) claimed that they are enriching our culture, 30% (n=26) think otherwise. On the other hand, a little bit over 40% of them (n=35) also stated that they are posing a threat against host country's lifestyle and national values. In both cases, there are 23-25% of respondents who are hesitant to make a definite statement (n=20-22). It seems some people are in-between and feeling perplexed when it comes to judge these two important issues and their views can be changed positively after having more contact with migrants.



The role of the media is another important indicator as it may generate negative images on migrants shaping perceptions and fuelling negative sentiments towards migration, thus hindering acceptance and social cohesion. As the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, notes recently that the stigmatization of refugees and migrants was unprecedented in history. He also




underlines the poisonous language directed at refugees and migrants through politics, media and even social media. A recent report released by a Turkish NGO stated that refugees and migrants are usually represented within a negative context and associated with negative incidents is much higher than those which are positive. This, in return, contributes the reinforcement of negative and misleading judgments in the public opinion that the refugees and migrants commit crimes and are involved in illegal acts. However, only 56% of all Turkish respondents (n=48) reported that news on media focus on negativity while 27% (n=23) neither agree nor disagree.

International Students

Demographic data

This survey was completed by 60 participants in total: 21 females, 39 males. The vast majority of participants are young, mostly between 18-20 (n=23), 21-23 (n=7) and 24-26 (n=9). 61.67% of the students (n=37) are in college at undergraduate level. Only 4 participants pursue master's degrees.

The majority of students are from different engineering programs (n=30), while there are students from College of Social Sciences (Law, Psychology, International Relations) and from College of Administration.



The majority of the students are holding Asian citizenship with a ratio of 78.33% (n=47). The students are mostly coming from Iran, Afghanistan, Palestine, Pakistan, Syria and Jordan. The ratio of students from Europe is 10% (n=6) while ratio of students coming from Africa is 8.33% (n=5).


Unlike native students at Koç University, the majority of migrant students (73.33%, n=44) claimed that they feel they belong to a religion. Only 18.33% of participants (n=11) stated that they do not believe in a religion while almost 8% (n=5) are either not sure or not willing to share the information. The vast majority of migrant students are Sunni Muslims (91.11%, n=41) but there are also small number of different denominations of Christianity and other religions. Those who claimed they feel they belong to a religion also belong to Sunni Islam.

When we look at the socio-economic indicators, we can conclude that more than half of the participants belong to higher SES (56.66%, n=34) – in other words, above average SES. Some participants (36.67%, n=22) noted that they come from families with average income. Only 4


participants belong to lower SES.

Intergroup contact

Most of the participants are living in Turkey for more than a year (65%, n=39) or at least for a year (6.67%, n=4). Only 1.67% (n=1) stated that they do not have any contact with native people in Turkey. The majority of the participants (98.34%, n=59) have contact with native people. The places for meeting with native students are indicated as the university setting (classrooms, library, at university events/activities). It seems, however, they also meet outside the university, such as cafes, bars, shopping malls, and at parties. Besides, majority of their friends also have contact with native people (94.99%, n=57).




More than half of the participants (63.33%, n=38) are willing to attend meetings to support migrant people's rights in Turkey. Although they want to be active for claiming rights for migrant people, they are rather not willing to participate into peaceful demonstrations for right to vote in Turkey. The ratio of participants who claimed they 'completely agree' or 'agree' is 28.33% (=17 participants). The participants who 'neither agree or disagree', 'disagree' or 'completely disagree' constitute the majority (71.67%, n=43).



Perceived hostility

Only 25% of respondents (n=15) feel that they do not feel any hostility in their access for labor markets, social services and welfare. The vast majority have different feeling about this socio-economic indicator.



Migrant adults

Demographic data

This last survey was completed by 50 participants in total: 30 males, 18 females, and 1 other, 1 unknown individual. The majority of participants are young, mostly between 18-20 (n=40). Most of the participants are from Asia (86%, n=43). They are coming predominantly from Syria. Only a

small portion of them come from Europe (12%, n=6).

Unlike the other respondent groups, the vast majority of non-student migrant participants responded that they feel they belong to a religious institution (84%, n=42). Those participants observing a religion mostly stated that they belong to Sunni Islam.


Half of the participants have a high school degree (50%, n=25), while 30% of the participants (n=15) hold a university degree. 36% of the participants (n=18) are unemployed whereas 32% of them (n=16) are employees. Those who are employees responded that they work as teachers, translators or shop assistants. The other category (24%, n=12) include former students, PhD students or students that are currently looking for scholarships in Turkish universities.

When we look at SES of the participants, only 32% of them (n=16) belong to higher SES – in other words average or above average SES. However, there is not any single participant that responded as ‘wealthy’ for their SES. 68% of them (n=34) are coming from lower SES, which is understandable given the lower educational attainment of participants.


Intergroup contact

The majority of participants are living in Turkey for more than a year (98%, n=49). Only 1 participant (2%) is living in Turkey for a year. Given their duration of stay and SES, we may argue that their stay in Turkey has brought economic hardship for them. This is in line with the general economic situation of Syrian refugees that most of them live in poverty and even extreme poverty.

It is interesting to see that all participants in this group have contact with native people to some extent. 34% of the participants responded that they have known many or quite a lot people (n=17). Those who responded as ‘few’ and ‘some’ correspond to 66% that equals to 33 participants. The places for meeting with native people are workplaces, university settings (classrooms, library, at university events/activities) or outside university, such as cafes, bars and shopping malls.




The majority of the participants are willing to attend meetings to support migrants' rights (80%, n=40). 40% of the participants (n=20) agreed to participate into peaceful demonstrations for gaining right to vote in elections in Turkey. However, it is important to note that those participants who 'neither agree nor disagree' to participate into peaceful demonstrations for demanding rights still constitute 40% (n=20).




Perceived hostility

It is important to note that 82% of all respondents (n=41) feel hostility in accessing jobs and social welfare among native and migrant people. Some of them even confessed that they experienced

these tensions first-hand. When there is economic downturn and jobs are scarce, migrants unfortunately become the scapegoats in society.



To answer to media's negative coverage of migrants, 46% of all respondents (n=23) believed that media generates negative views of migrants whereas there is a high percentage of people (40%, n=20) who neither agreed nor disagreed about the negative images in the media concerning migrants.



Survey main results in Netherlands


Native students

Demographic data

This was completed by 88 Netherlands students: 57 females and 31 males. As expected in a university setting, the vast majority of participants are young, mostly between 18-20 (n=60) and 21-23 (n=24). More than half of participants (78.5%, n= 62) have at least a High school degree level, while 15.9% (n= 14) have another educational level. Furthermore, the majority of the participants (80.7%, n= 71) claimed that they do not belong to any religion, while 14.8% claimed they belong to a religion. Referring to the socio economic situation, 15.6% (n= 14) of the respondents considered their SES as wealthy, 33% (n=29) as better than most, 31.8% (n= 28) as good and 15.9% (n= 14) as mediocre. Only 3.4% (n= 3) of the respondents assessed their SES as poor or worse than most.


Intergroup contact

It is interesting that the majority of the participants (77.6%, n=52) have many contacts with migrant people and/or migrant students. When asked about the amount people of the immigrants group they have occasional contact with, the majority of participants (82.1%, n=55) either stated that they have occasional encounters with many migrants. When asked about how many of their friends have migrants' friends, 6.3% (n= 4) stated they had few friends that were friends immigrants, 30.2% (n= 19) stated some, 46% (n= 29) many, and 15.9% (n= 10) quite a lot. Only 1.6% (n= 1) stated not to have any friend that had migrants' friends.




Attitudes towards immigrants

Migrants enriching or endangering the dominant culture? The answers to the questions whether migrants are enriching the dominant culture or if they pose a threat against host country's lifestyle and national values are interesting. While on one hand 76.1% of all respondents (n=35) claimed that immigrants are enriching natives' culture, 10.8% (n=5) think otherwise and 13% (n= 6) are undecided. On the other hand, 15.9% of them (n=7) stated that they are posing a threat against host country's lifestyle and national values while for 75% (n= 33) immigrants did not represent a threat for the country lifestyle and 9.1% (n= 4) were undecided.



The role of the media is another important indicator as it may generate negative images on migrants shaping perceptions and fuelling negative sentiments towards migration, thus hindering acceptance and social cohesion. Assessing whether media portrayals of immigrants were mainly negative, 72.1% of the respondents agreed that news on media focus on negativity while 20.9% neither agree nor disagree.



International students

Demographic data

This survey was completed by 79 participants in total: 52 females, 26 males. The vast majority of participants are young, mostly between 18-20 (n=42) and 21-23 (n=27). 66.2% (n= 43) of the respondents had a high school degree level and 30.8% (n= 20) stated that they had a University level. The majority of the students are holding European citizenship with a ratio of 54.4% (n=43), while 13.9% (n= 11) are American, 11,4% (n= 9) from Asia, 7.6% (n= 6) from Africa and only 1.3% (n= 1) from Australia. Furthermore, 6.3% (n= 5) of the respondents stated they were both European and American, 2.5% (n= 2) European and Asian, 1.3% (n= 1) European and African and 1.3% (n= 1)


American and Asian.

The majority of migrant students living in Netherland (64.6%, n=51) claimed that they feel they do not belong to any religion, while 27.8% of participants (n=22) stated that they do belong to a religion and almost 8% (n=6) are either not sure or not willing to share the information.

When we look at the socio-economic indicators, we can conclude that more than half of the participants belong to at least a good SES (88,5%, n=70). Some participants (11.4%, n=9) noted that they belong to a poor or mediocre SES. Furthermore, more than half of the respondents stated to be single (89.9%, n= 71).

Intergroup contact

Most of the participants are living in Netherland for more than a year (80%, n=52) or at least for 6 months (12.3%, n=8). The majority of the participants (90.2%, n=55) have contacts with at least some native people.




Moreover, most of participants claimed they have some (29.5%, n=18), many (26.2%, n=16), quite a lot (21.3%, n= 13) and few (23%, n= 14) superficial contacts with natives. Besides, majority of their friends also have contact with at least some native people (36.1%, n=22), while 27.9% (n=17) claimed that few of their friends have native friends, for 13.1% (n=8) many and for 19.7% (n= 12)

quite a lot of their friends have native friends.

More than half of the participants (35.6%, n=16 agree and 28.9%, n= 13 completely agree) are willing to attend meetings to support migrant people's rights in their host society, while 15.6% (n=7) stated they are not willing to participate and 20% (n= 9) are undecided.

Referring to media's negative coverage of migrants, 43.2% of all respondents (n=19) believed that media generates negative views of migrants, while 54.5% (n= 24) of the respondents are undecided.



IV. Statistics comparisons among countries and samples

Participants: Migrant adults

Data were collected in Italy and Turkey. In Italy the sample comprised 138 immigrants (83 men, Mage= 31.81 (813); 55 women, Mage= 30.91 (9.46)). The vast majority of respondents (76.8%) declare themselves as belonging to a religion while 15.9% didn't consider they belonged to any religion and 7.2% were undecided. Among the respondents that declare to profess a religion, participants declare to profess mainly Christian (9.4% other Christian religion, 10.1% protestant, 41.3% Roman catholic) and Islamic religion (13.8%). Moreover, the large part of respondents

perceived their socio-economic situation as good. In fact, 0.7% (n= 1) of respondents declares to be economically wealthy, 4.3% (n= 6) perceives their socio-economic situation as better than most, 30.40% (n= 45) as good, 19.6% (n= 27) claimed to be poor and 10,9% (n= 15) perceived their economic situation as worse than most. Referring to the level of instruction, the most commonly reported level of educational attainment was some university and some High school. Only 2.9% (n= 4) of respondents declares not to have any instruction. 4.3% (n= 6) declares they have been to elementary school, 27.8% (n= 37) have been to high school, 55.1% (n= 76) to university, 7.2% (n= 10) to college and 2.9% (n= 4) declares their have had other unspecified type of instruction.

In Turkey, data were collected from 111 immigrants (73 men, $M_{age}= 25.65$ (6.46); 36 women, $M_{age}= 26.41$ (8.22)). As in the Italian sample, the large part of the respondents (87.4%) declared themselves as belonging to a religion, while 9.9% considered themselves as not belonging to any religion and only 2.7 claimed they didn't know. Among the respondents, almost all participants claimed they professed Sunni Islam religion (90.1%). When we look at SES of the participants, 32.4% of them considered they SES as good, 43.2% as mediocre 14,4% as poor. 3.6% of respondents assessed they SES as better than most while 6.3% considered they SES as worse than most. Referring to the level of instruction, the most commonly reported level of educational attainment was some university and some High school. 45% (n=50) declared to have a high school level of instruction, 37.8% (n=42) a university level, 5.4% (n=6) an elementary school level and 3.6% (n=4) a college level. 8.1% (n=9) of the respondents declared they had other unspecified level of instruction.

Results

Mean and standard deviation and t-test on all variables were calculated separately for immigrant in turkey and immigrants in Italy. Immigrants in the Italian sample reported significantly higher levels of perceived hostility compared to immigrants in the Turkish sample. On the other hand, immigrants in the Turkish sample reported significantly higher levels of culture adoption and culture integration compared to immigrants in the Italian sample. There were no significant differences

between the Italian and Turkish sample on positive contact, negative contact, culture maintenance, culture segregation and dual identity.

Variables	Italy		Turkey		t-test
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	
Positive contact	3.63	.89	3.62	.92	$t(242) = .122, p = .90$
Negative contact	2.08	0.77	1.99	0.73	$t(242) = .913, p = .36$
Culture maintenance	3.73	1.03	3.65	0.87	$t(242) = .616, p = .54$
Culture segregation	4.04	1.00	3.84	.87	$t(242) = 1.71, p = .09$
Culture adoption	3.46	1.02	3.79	0.85	$t(242) = -2.7, p < .05$
Culture integration	3.60	1.00	4.02	0.78	$t(242) = -3.58, p < .001$
Dual identity	3.52	1.06	3.74	0.92	$t(242) = -1.74, p = .08$
Perceived hostility	3.12	0.93	2.54	0.85	$t(242) = 4.96, p < .001$

mean, standard deviation and t-test on the mean of the two samples

Bivariate correlations among variables were conducted separately for immigrants in the Italian sample and immigrants in the Turkish sample and are reported in the table below.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1.Positive contact	-	-.479**	.017	.014	.327**	.389**	.418**	-.320**
2.Negative contact	-.535**	-	-.113	-.102	-.290**	-.283**	-.249**	.305**
3.Culture maintenance	.018	.026	-	.517**	.387**	.321**	.101	-.043
4.Culture segregation	-.118	-.017	.572**	-	.552**	.375**	.156	-.019
5.Culture adoption	.249**	-.188*	.082	.082	-	.676**	.436**	-.172
6.Culture integration	.187*	-.172*	-.029	.022	.649**	-	.373**	-.176
7.Dual identity	.217*	-.123	.031	.039	.491**	.503**	-	-.170
8.Hostility perception	-.103	.253**	-.007	-.012	-.155	-.246**	-.059	-

Correlations are reported above the diagonal for immigrants' participants of the Turkish sample and below the diagonal for immigrants' participants of the Italian sample.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Regression

Variables	Italy	
	Positive contact	Negative contact
Culture maintenance	$B = .05, t(134) = .445, p = .657$	$B = .51, t(134) = .50, p = .62$
	$F(2, 134) = .145, p = .865$	

Culture segregation	$B = -.178, t(134) = -1.766, p = .08$	$B = -.112, t(134) = -1.11, p = .269$
	$F(2, 134) = 1.578, p = .210$	
Culture adoption	$B = .209, t(134) = 2.111, p < .05$	$B = -.076, t(134) = -.774, p = .44$
	$F(2, 134) = 4.766, R^2 = .05, p < .05$	
	$F(2, 134) = .475, p = .623$	
Hostility perception	$B = .045, t(134) = .457, p = .648$	$B = .278, t(134) = 2.808, p < .05$
	$F(2, 134) = 4.708, R^2 = .05, p < .05$	
Dual identity	$B = .212, t(134) = 2.124, p < .05$	$B = -.009, t(134) = -.093, p = .926$
	$F(2, 134) = 3.314, R^2 = .03, p < .05$	

Variables	Turkey	
	Positive contact	Negative contact
Culture maintenance	$B = -.048, t(104) = -.434, p = .665$	$B = -.136, t(104) = 1.223, p = .224$
	$F(2, 104) = .763, p = .469$	
Culture segregation	$B = -.045, t(104) = -.410, p = .683$	$B = -.124, t(104) = -1.115, p = .267$
	$F(2, 104) = .632, p = .534$	
Culture adoption	$B = .243, t(104) = 2.336, p < .05$	$B = -.174, t(104) = -1.666, p = .1$
	$F(2, 104) = 7.760, R^2 = .113, p < .005$	
	$F(2, 104) = 1.155, p = .319$	
Hostility perception	$B = -.225, t(104) = -2.166, p < .05$	$B = .197, t(104) = 1.890, p = .06$
	$F(2, 104) = 7.906, R^2 = .12, p < .005$	
Dual identity	$B = .388, t(104) = 3.826, p < .001$	$B = -.063, t(104) = -.622, p = .535$
	$F(2, 104) = 11.230, R^2 = .16, p < .001$	


T-test

Paired sample t-test on the immigrant of Italian sample revealed that positive contact was more frequent ($M = 3.63$) than negative contact ($M = 2.08$); $t(136) = 12.414, p < .001$. For the immigrants of the Turkish sample, the t-test also revealed that positive contact ($M = 3.57$) was more frequent than negative contact ($M = 2.00$); $t(106) = 11.481, p < .001$

Interactions of predictors (positive and negative contacts) on the dependent variables

Perceived hostility

Italy



$F(3, 133) = 7.832, R^2 = .15, p < .001$; *contpos* : $B = .035, t(133) = .34, p = .73 [-.162 \ .231]$; *contneg* : $B = .226, t(133) = 1.911, p = .058 [-.008 \ .459]$; *interaction* : $B = -.36, t(133) = -3.636, p < .001 [-.555 \ -.164]$.

Migrant people in the Italian context with low positive contact showed higher perceived hostility when they have high compared to low negative contact. When positive contact is high, people showed no significant difference on perceived hostility between those with high and low negative contact.

Turkey

$F(3, 103) = 5.343, R^2 = .13, p < .005$; *contpos* : $B = -.206, t(103) = -2.124, p < .05 [-.398 \ -.014]$; *contneg* : non significant $p = .06$. Interaction non significant

Participants: Migrants students

Data were collected in Italy, Germany, Netherland and Turkey. The data from Italy, Netherland and Germany were then merge into one sample as European sample. In Italy, Netherland and Germany, the whole sample comprised 180 immigrants' students (58 men, Mage= 24.1 (6.2); 112 women, Mage= 24.34 (5.82)). Of the participants, 32.8% declared themselves as belonging to a religion while 55.6% claimed they didn't consider they belonged to any religion and 5.6% were undecided. Moreover, the large part of respondents perceived their socio-economic situation as good. In fact, 4.4% (n= 8) of respondents declares to be economically wealthy, 26.7% (n= 48) perceives

their socio-economic situation as better than most, 37.2% (n= 67) as good, 17.8% (n= 32) as mediocre, 6.7% (n= 12) claimed to be poor and 2.2% (n= 4) perceived their economic situation as worse than most. Referring to the level of instruction, the most commonly reported level of educational attainment was some university and some High school. 1.7% (n= 3) declared they went to college, 41.7% (n= 75) have been to high school, 38.9% (n= 70) to university, .6% (n=1) had an HBO and 4.4% (n= 8) declared they have had other unspecified type of instruction.

In Turkey, data were collected from 141 immigrants (94 men, $M_{age}= 25,97 (5,7)$; 43 women, $M_{age}= 23,21 (4,77)$). The large part of the respondents (79,4%) declared themselves as belonging to a religion, while 15,6% considered themselves as not belonging to any religion and only 5% claimed they didn't know. Among the respondents, almost all participants claimed they professed Islam religion (74,5%). When we look at SES of the participants, 25,5% of them considered they SES as good, 46,8% as mediocre, 12,8% as poor. 12,8% of respondents assessed they SES as better than most while 2,1% considered they SES as wealthy. Referring to the level of instruction, the most commonly reported level of educational attainment was some university and some High school. 36,9% (n=52) declared to have a high school level of instruction, 57,4% (n=81) a university level and 0,7% (n=1) a college level. 5% (n=7) of the respondents declared they had other unspecified level of instruction.

Results

Mean and standard deviation of all variables were calculated separately for immigrant in turkey and immigrants in the merge sample. Immigrants in the European sample reported significantly higher levels of Positive contact, compared to immigrants in the Turkish sample. On the other hand, immigrants in the Turkish sample reported higher levels of negative contact and culture integration, compared to immigrants in the European sample. There was no significant difference

between the two samples on culture maintenance, culture segregation, culture adoption, dual identity and perceived hostility

Variables	Europe		Turkey		<i>t-test</i>
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	
Positive contact	3.81	.76	3.61	.76	$t(279) = 2.17, p < .05$
Negative contact	1.81	.54	2.01	.70	$t(279) = -2.74, p < .05$
Culture maintenance	3.43	.91	3.44	.83	$t(268) = -.09, p = .93$
Culture segregation	3.55	.99	3.64	.96	$t(268) = -.73, p = .47$
Culture adoption	3.77	.74	3.81	.80	$t(268) = -.38, p = .71$
Culture integration	3.85	.81	4.06	.82	$t(268) = -2.15, p < .05$
Dual identity	3.84	.84	3.74	.96	$t(268) = .91, p = .36$
Perceived hostility	2.37	.95	2.39	.90	$t(208) = -.18, p = .86$

Bivariate correlations among variables were conducted separately for immigrants in the European sample and immigrants in the Turkish sample and are reported in the following table.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1.Positive contact	-	-.614**	-.083	-.040	.101	.169*	.330**	-.410**
2.Negative contact	-.746**	-	-.023	.095	.015	-.015	-.172*	.539**
3.Culture maintenance	.162	-.165	-	.518**	-.025	-.130	-.022	.006
4.Culture segregation	.117	-.125	.556**	-	.289**	.170*	.108	.155
5.Culture adoption	.056	-.068	-.048	.055	-	.659**	.434**	.025
6.Culture integration	.274**	-.174*	-.120	.036	.397**	-	.555**	-.011
7.Dual identity	.449**	-.334**	.108	.044	.154	.293*	-	-.120
8.Perceived hostility	-.201	.348**	-.061	-.119	-.053	-.098	-.254*	-

Correlations are reported above the diagonal for immigrants' participants of the Turkish sample and below the diagonal for immigrants' participants of the European sample.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Regression

Variables	Europe	
	Positive contact	Negative contact
Culture maintenance	$Ns, p = .5$	$Ns, p = .44$
	$F(2, 130) = 2.054, p = .132$	

Culture segregation	<i>Ns, p= .68</i>	<i>Ns, p= .51</i>
	<i>F (2, 130) = 1.113, p= .33</i>	
Culture adoption	<i>Ns, p= .93</i>	<i>Ns, p= .65</i>
	<i>F (2, 130) = .31, p= .74</i>	
Personal integration	<i>b= .35, t (130) = 2.574, p<.05</i>	<i>Ns, p= .59</i>
	<i>R²= .08, F (2, 130) = 5.441, p< .05</i>	
Hostility perception	<i>Ns, p= .45</i>	<i>B= .76, t (130) = 2.657, p< .05</i>
	<i>R[*] = .13, F (2, 70) = 5.153, p< .05</i>	
Dual identity	<i>B= .50, t (129) = 3.809, p< .001</i>	<i>Ns, p= 1</i>
	<i>, R²= .20, F (2, 129) = 16.282, p< .001</i>	

Variables	Turkey	
	Positive contact	Negative contact
Culture maintenance	<i>Ns, p= .16</i>	<i>Ns, p= .28</i>
	<i>F (2, 134) =1.060, p= .35</i>	
Culture segregation	<i>Ns, p= .78</i>	<i>Ns, p= .3</i>
	<i>F (2, 134) = .653, p= .52</i>	
Culture adoption	<i>Ns, p= .10</i>	<i>Ns, p= .25</i>
	<i>F (2, 134) = 1.364, p= .26</i>	
Personal integration	<i>B= .256, t (134) = 2,391, p< .05</i>	<i>Ns, p= .19</i>
	<i>F (2, 134) = 2.876, p= .06</i>	
Hostility perception	<i>Ns, p= .17</i>	<i>B= .461, t (134) = 5,039, p< .001</i>
	<i>F (2, 134) = 28.801, R²= .29, p< .001</i>	
Dual identity	<i>B= .360, t (134) = 3.487, p< .005</i>	<i>Ns, p= .64</i>
	<i>F (2, 134) = 8.311, R²= .11, p< .001</i>	


T-test

Paired sample t-test on the immigrant of European sample revealed that positive contact was more frequent ($M= 3.81$) than negative contact ($M= 1.81$); $t (143) = 19.734, p<.001$. For the immigrants of the Turkish sample, the t-test also revealed that positive contact ($M= 3,61$) was more frequent than negative contact ($M= 2.01$); $t (137) = 14.294, p< .001$

Interactions of predictors (positive and negative contacts) on the dependent variables

Social integration

European sample



$F(3, 129) = 5.048, R^2 = .11, p < .05$; *contpos*: $B = .383, t(129) = 2.819, p < .05 [.114 .651]$; *contneg*: $B = -.038, t(129) = -.192, p = .85 [-.432 -.355]$; *interaction*: $B = -.283, t(129) = -2.002, p = .05 [-.563 -.003]$.

Migrant students in the European context with high positive contact showed higher personal integration when they had low compared to high negative contact. When positive contact is low, people showed no significant difference on social integration between those with high and low negative contact.

Participants: Natives students

Data were collected in Italy, Germany, Netherland and Turkey. The data from Italy, Netherland and Germany were then merge into one sample as European sample. In Italy, Netherland and Germany, the whole sample comprised 216 natives' students (94 men, Mage= 22.21 (5,46); 119 women, Mage= 24.55 (5,91) and 3 other, Mage= 23 (1.73). The vast majority of respondents (70.1%) declare themselves as not belonging to any religion while 22% claimed they belonged to a religion and 7.2% were undecided. Moreover, the large part of respondents perceived their socio-economic situation as good. In fact, 5.9% (n= 18) of respondents declares to be economically wealthy, 19.1% (n= 58) perceived their socio-economic situation as better than most, 42.4% (n= 129) as good, 22.7% (n=69) claimed they SES were mediocre, 2% (n= 6) claimed to be poor and 6.9% (n= 21) perceived

their economic situation as worse than most. Referring to the level of instruction, the most commonly reported level of educational attainment was some university (15.8% (n= 48)) and the large part High school (71.4% (n= 217)). 5.3% (n= 16) of respondents declares they have had other unspecified type of instruction and 2.6% (n= 8) had a college level.

In Turkey, data were collected from 363 native students (157 men, Mage= 22.45 (5.88); 143 women, Mage= 22.63 (5.83)). As in the Italian sample, the large part of the respondents (49.9%) declared themselves as belonging to a religion, while 25.3% considered themselves as not belonging to any religion and 7.7% claimed they did not know. When we look at SES of the participants, 28.4% of them considered they SES as good, 25.3% as mediocre, only 0.8% as poor. 24% of respondents assessed they SES as better than most while only 0.8% considered they SES as worse than most and 3.6% as wealthy. Referring to the level of instruction, the most commonly reported level of educational attainment was some university (47.9%) and many High school (47.9%) and 3.6% a college level. 2.2% of the respondents declared they had other unspecified level of instruction.

Results

Mean and standard deviation of all variables were calculated separately for natives in turkey and natives in the merge sample. Natives in the European sample reported higher levels of positive contact and attitudes towards immigration compared to natives in the Turkish sample. On the other hand, natives in the Turkish sample reported negative contact compared to natives in the European sample. There were no significant differences between the two samples on perceived hostility

Variables	Italy/Germany/Netherland		Turkey		t-test
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	
Positive contact	3.93	.64	3.14	.91	$t(394) = 10.239, p < .001$
Negative contact	1.70	.50	1.92	.70	$t(394) = -3.648, p < .001$
Perceived hostility	3.28	.83	3.37	.93	$t(253) = -.877, p = .38$
Attitudes toward immigration	4	.73	2.71	.88	$t(344) = 14.776, p < .001$

Bivariate correlations among variables were conducted separately for immigrants in the European sample and immigrants in the Turkish sample and are reported bellow.

	1	2	3	4
1.Positive contact	-	-.702**	-.264**	.634**
2.Negative contact	-.546**	-	.286**	-.531**
3.Perceived hostility	-.113	.192*	-	-.217**
4.Attitudes toward immigration	.472**	-.545**	-.058	-

Correlations are reported above the diagonal for immigrants' participants of the Turkish sample and below the diagonal for immigrants' participants of the European sample.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

T-test

Paired sample t-test on the native European sample revealed that positive contact was more frequent ($M = 3.93$) than negative contact ($M = 1.7$); $t(218) = 33.043$, $p < .001$. For the natives of the Turkish sample, the t-test also revealed that positive contact ($M = 3.14$) was more frequent than negative contact ($M = 1.92$); $t(176) = 10.985$, $p < .001$.

Regression


Variables	Europe		Turkey	
	Positive contact	Negative contact	Positive contact	Negative contact
Perceived hostility	ns , $p = .76$	ns , $p = .1$	ns , $p = .33$	ns , $p = .09$
	$F(2, 108) = 2.114$, $p = .13$		$F(2, 141) = 6.802$, $R^2 = .08$, $p < .005$	
Attitudes towards immigration	$B = .270$, $t(191) = 3.345$, $p < .005$	$B = -.588$, $t(191) = -5.692$, $p < .001$	$B = .503$, $t(149) = 5.699$, $p < .001$	ns , $p = .13$
	$F(2, 191) = 48.220$, $R^2 = .34$, $p < .001$		$F(2, 149) = 51.910$, $R^2 = .41$, $p < .001$	

Interactions of predictors (positive and negative contacts) on the dependent variables

Attitudes towards immigration

European sample

$F(3, 190) = 36.323$, $R^2 = .37$, $p < .001$; *contpos* : $B = -.273$, $t(190) = 3.458$, $p < .005$ [.117, .429] ; *contneg* : $B = -.446$, $t(190) = -3.979$, $p < .001$ [-.668, -.225] ; *interaction* : $B = .272$, $t(190) = 2.943$, $p < .005$ [.09, .455].



Native students in the European context with low positive contact showed higher positive attitudes towards immigration when they have low negative contact and less positive attitudes when negative contact is high. Furthermore, higher positive contact, increases natives' positive attitudes towards immigration even when negative contact is high.

V. General T-Test on samples.

Immigrants sample

Basing on studies conducted in different countries that suggest that within intergroup interaction, positive contact are more frequent than negative one, we hypothesized that independently of the country of living, there will be no differences in the mean of positive and negative contact across sample of immigrants living in Italy and sample of immigrants living in turkey. We then run independent sample t-test in order to check whether there was a difference in the mean of the two group, for positive and negative contact. As we can expect, the Levene test were non-significant. Furthermore the t-test were not significant, both for positive (Italy: $M = 3.63$; Turkey: $M = 3.62$); $t(242) = .122$, $p = .90$ and negative contact (Italy: $M = 2.08$; Turkey: $M = 1.99$); $t(242) = .913$, $p = .36$. this suggest that there is no significant difference in the mean of the two groups

Immigrants students' sample

Basing on studies conducted in different countries that suggest that within intergroup interaction, positive contact are more frequent than negative one, we hypothesized that independently of the country of living, there will be no differences in the mean of positive and negative contact across sample of immigrants students living in Europe (Italy and Germany) and sample of immigrants students living in turkey. We then run independent sample t-test in order to check whether there was a difference in the mean of the two group, for positive and negative contact. We found that the Levene test were non-significant for positive contact but were significant for negative contact. Furthermore the t-test were significant for both positive (Europe: $M= 3.81$; Turkey: $M= 3.61$; $t(279)= 2.165$, $p< .05$ and negative contact (Italy: $M= 1.81$; Turkey: $M= 2.01$); $t(279)= -.2.739$, $p< .05$.

Natives students

Basing on studies conducted in different countries that suggest that within intergroup interaction, positive contact are more frequent than negative one, we hypothesized that independently of the country of living, there will be no differences in the mean of positive and negative contact across sample of natives students living in Europe (Italy and Germany) and sample of natives students living in turkey. We then run independent sample t-test in order to check whether there was a difference in the mean of the two group, for positive and negative contact. We found that the Levene test were significant for both positive and negative contact. Furthermore the t-test were significant for negative contact (Europe: $M= 1.7$; Turkey: $M= 1.92$; $t(394)= -3.526$, $p< .001$, and for positive contact (Europe: $M= 3.94$; Turkey: $M= 3.14$); $t(394)= 10.239$, $p < .001$

VI. Report of focus group with migrant people in Netherlands

VII. Conclusions

The continuous conflicts that arise and are still going on in the world lead to large movement of people from their countries to countries where they can start a new life. However, for the receiving countries this ever-growing influx of incoming people represent a challenge for many countries, as it poses the issues of how to redistribute the available resources, how to manage the presence of these people in terms of economic, political and social situation while preserving their rights. But above all, how to manage the integration with the native population. Across the years, many laws and policies (document, work rights, residence. etc) have been adopted to regularize as much as possible the immigrants' situation. These laws and policies are applied according to the socio-political status of immigrants. In this vein, the content of laws and policies for the immigrants situation regularization vary according to the category of immigrants, that is whether they entered in the host country for family reunion, temporary or permanent work, studies, tourism and with the appropriate documents. However, the most complex situation, which is at the basis of so many debates in welcomes countries is the refugees or asylum seeker situation. In the European Union area, laws and policies on refugees and asylum seeker are more inclusive, as due to the European law on the Humanitarian Protection, each refugees and Asylum seeker have the right to stay in the country in which he arrived first and to benefit of humanitarian protection if the reason for their immigration involves obtaining it. At this regard, policies to ease social inclusion have been implemented, such as work, educational and settlement opportunities. In the non-European Union area, however, the law and policies on refugees and asylum seeker are more restrictive, limitation the possibilities for social inclusion.

However, still remain the problem of the effect of social interaction between immigrants and natives on a daily basis. In this report we tried to give an overview of some effects that contact may holds on immigrant, immigrant students and native students can hold on intergroup attitudes. In the immigrant sample, results showed that positive contact reinforce intergroup attitudes such willingness of social inclusion, in terms of willingness to adopt host culture and dual identification, in terms of identification with both the host country and the home country, whereas negative contact with natives group members increases the perceived hostility from the natives group. Moreover, low positive

contact showed higher perceived hostility when negative contact is high compared to when it is low.

In the immigrants' students' sample, positive contact increases personal integration, in terms of individual willingness to come into contact with host members culture and dual identity, while negative contact with native group members increases perceived hostility from native group, while positive contact decreases it. Moreover, high positive contact showed higher personal integration when they had low compared to high negative contact.

In the native sample, positive contact increases attitudes towards immigrants while negative contact reduces it, with a stronger effect of positive contact. Moreover, low positive contact showed higher positive attitudes towards immigration when negative contact is low and less positive attitudes when negative contact is high. Furthermore, higher positive contact, increases natives' positive attitudes towards immigration even when negative contact is high, suggesting a buffering effect of positive contact.

Intergroup contact, positive and negative, thus represent an important factor in shaping groups intergroup attitudes. For immigrants' intergroup contact encourage willingness of social integration with natives, whereas for native it increases attitudes of support towards immigrants.